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In the last decade, positive political theory (PPT) models of agency
policy-making have emphasized the tools politicians can use to control or
influence agency decisions. These models are, in part, a reaction to earlier
economic and other models of agency policy-making which emphasized the
agency losses attendant to the delegation of decision-making authority to
agencies by politicians. The more recent PPT works contend that politicians
use the tools of ex post and ex ante control to overcome some of the agency
problems associated with delegation (such as the inability to foresee the
issues the agency will face), in part by enlisting interest groups in the battle
to control agencies. These recent PPT models of political control do a good
job of illustrating how and why politicians try to influence agency policy-
making; but they overstate politicians' ability to do so, for two reasons.
First, commonly-employed methodological assumptions in positive models
tend to obscure the most important impediments to political control. Second,
the antecedents to the current PPT literature posed a false dichotomy
between agency autonomy and good government, one which some positive
theorists seem to continue to accept, at least implicitly. This article examines
these positive and normative biases in the PPT literature on the political
control of agencies, and argues that PPT policy models which abandon these
assumptions will do a better job of (1) describing the agency policy-making
process and (2) accommodating the fact of agency autonomy in the policy
process.
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Introduction
What can the tools of economics tell us about who controls the agency
policy-making process? Economics may be the dismal science, but its impact
on legal scholarship has been anything but dismal. To the contrary, recent
legal scholarship has been energized by analytical methods borrowed from
economics.1 Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of public law,
which has been transformed by the so-called "public choice" scholarship
growing out of the work of economist Kenneth Arrow.2 Economic models of
legislative choice have demonstrated the inherent instability of majority rule, 3
and economic models of regulation have challenged the legitimacy of the
policy process by portraying policy-makers as the willing instruments of self-
I. Nearly every traditional subject of legal education has been the subject of economic analysis.
Two general texts are ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
THEORY AN) PRACTICE (1990); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1989).
2. Arrow's theorem demonstrated formally the impossibility of constructing a collective choice
process that simultaneously satisfies several desirable democratic objectives. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (195.1). See also MALLOY, supra note 1, at 42-45 (providing concise
summary of Arrow's theorem). For a good summary of the impact of public choice literature on public
law, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW ANt) PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991); GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW (1991).
3. For a summary of the formal economic models which explore the instability or irrationality of
majority rule after Arrow's pioneering work, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 2, at 38-62; NORMAN
FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 15-31 (1978); WILLIAM H. RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM 115-92 (1982); Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice,
13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 259, 273-94 (1988).
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interested "rent-seekers." 4 These works have provoked a healthy debate over
the motives of the interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats who
participate in the policy process, and over the purpose of the process itself.5 A
recent line of scholarship spawned by these economic models of public law is
the so-called "positive political theory" (PPT) 6 of administrative agency
behavior, which has engaged political scientists, economists, and legal
scholars in a series of ongoing debates.7 One focal point of these debates is
the question of how much control elected politicians can or should exert over
agency policy-making. While there continues a lively debate within this
literature between the champions of congressional control and the champions
of presidential control, advocates of the view that administrative agencies can
or should exert a significant degree of policy-making independence
irrespective of politicians' preferences are virtually absent within PPT.8 Like
other economic models of law, PPT is gaining increasing influence over
administrative law scholarship. Therefore, the time is right to explore the
reasons for this bias against agency autonomy and, in so doing, to evaluate
the contributions of PPT scholarship to our understanding of administrative
policy-making.
Of course, the view that agencies can or should exert significant policy-
making independence is well represented outside of the PPT literature, within
4. In this context, "rent-seeking" refers to the use of the political process by a discrete constituent
group to gamer private benefits. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 2, at 12-37 (discussing theories of
public law that emphasize rent-seeking by interest groups). See also Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in
Practice and Theory, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (1993) (reviewing FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note
2); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as
Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1,7 (1990).
5. This literature is far too large to summarize here. For excellent summaries of legal scholarship
on point, see generally FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 2; ROBINSON, supra note 2. 1 discuss some of the
contributors from the social sciences in Sections I.A. and Subsection II.A.2. One of the best known and
most vehement critics of the public choice literature, particularly its view of political actors as rent-
seekers, is Judge Mikva. See Abner Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 167, 167-69 (1988).
6. By "positive political theory," I mean all rational choice approaches to the study of
administrative agency policy-making, including formal and informal models. I use the term "positive
political theory" (PPT) rather than "rational choice" because it seems to be more commonly used within
this literature. For a discussion of these terms in the context of the political control literature, see Daniel
A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457
(1992) (discussing compatibility of PPT with conventional public law theory).
7. These debates are memorialized in the proceedings of several research symposia. See
Symposium, Conference on the Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1 (1992); Symposium, Conference on the Organization of Political Institutions, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. (1990); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992);
Symposium, Regulating Regulation. The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures and
Regulatory Instruments, 1994 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1.
8. Among the active participants in the PPT debates, Jerry Mashaw has argued directly that
agencies should exert significant policy-making independence. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions. I J.L. EcON. & ORG. 81, 91-99 (1985). There are
scholars who claim that agencies are able to exert significant policy-making discretion when it serves
politicians' policy objectives to grant agencies that discretion. See discussion infra Section I.C. and Part
II. While PPT scholars appreciate some aspects of agency autonomy, they overlook many others. See
discussion infra Part I.
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both political science 9 and legal scholarship,'(' and the "problem" of agency
independence sparked the PPT debate over the political control issue."' Why
then do so few positive theorists credit agencies with a large degree of policy-
making independence irrespective of what politicians want? And why do even
fewer positive theorists advocate such independence? Critics have challenged
PPT models on several grounds,' 2 but none have explored the roots of the
problem, which lie in positive theory's methods and history.
Some of the methodological assumptions that PPT models employ tend to
obscure important aspects of agency policy-making, and to overstate the
leverage political actors have over that process. Specifically, positive theorists
tend to gloss over (1) how policy expertise and professional norms drive the
development and content of the relevant actors' policy preferences, (2) the
importance of substantive policy foresight at the legislative stage in the
struggle to exert ex ante control, (3) the political reasons why politicians
prefer to leave some important policy issues to the agency's discretion, and
(4) the ability of agencies to evade political controls. PPT grew out of an
earlier literature that poses a false dichotomy between bureaucratic autonomy
and good government. As a consequence, some positive theorists employ the
unstated normative assumption that a well-functioning democracy requires a
high degree of political control over agency policy-making. I argue that,
depending upon the goals we set for agency policy-making and the
characteristics and distribution of policy preferences among the agency,
politicians, and the public, the public is sometimes better served by less
political control over agency policy-making.
This Article challenges the methodological and normative assumptions of
PPT from within the PPT paradigm and suggests that these assumptions
ought to be reexamined. In Part I, I trace the evolution of this sometimes
9. There are far too many examples to summarize here. However, a good summary of the political
science literature, including works advocating agency independence, is found in KENNETH J. MEIER,
POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: POLICYMAKING IN THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 48-79
(1993). This point of view is common among political scientists within the subfields of public
administration and public policy. For an interesting normative defense of agency policy-making
independence by a political scientist, see JOHN A. ROHR, To RUN A CONSTITUTION: THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 171-94 (1986).
10. Once again, this is an enormous literature, some of which I discuss in Part 11. One recent and
prominent example is SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA (1992).
II. See infra Section I.A.
12. Some critics object to the notion that policy-making can be modeled as a rational choice at all,
an idea which is fundamental to the PPT approach. See discussion infra Section I.A. and note 24. Others,
primarily political scientists, have charged that rational choice/PPT analyses are unscientific, over-
ambitious, and of little practical value. See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994); Theodore J. Lowi, The State in Political Science: How We Became
What We Study, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. I (1992). Most relevant to this analysis is the critique that objects
to the motives ascribed to policy-makers by early economic models. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra
note 2, at 37; Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining the Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and
Critical Stories of Legal Development, 6 J.L. ECoN. & ORG. 267, 280 (1990); Mikva, supra note 5, at
167-74.
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technical literature from the early economic models of agency behavior to the
current PPT debate between proponents of congressional and presidential
control. In Part II, I explore the various tools of ex post and ex ante control
advanced by PPT scholars, and the specific methodological reasons why PPT
models tend to both overestimate their effectiveness and overlook or
minimize the amount of policy-making independence agencies routinely
exert. n Part [I, I examine the origins of the PPT normative bias against
political control, and the extent to which that bias continues to inform current
PPT scholarship. Finally, I conclude in Part IV by arguing that a closer
examination of the role these assumptions play within the PPT ought to show
us how that literature can accommodate a greater role for agency expertise
and discretion in future analyses of the agency policy-making process.'
3
I. PPT Models of Agency Policy-Making and Political Control
One cannot fully understand the current PPT debate over agency policy-
making without first examining the scholarly theories from which it arose. As
I describe below, some of the methodological and normative biases against
agency policy-making discretion in current PPT models are traceable to their
historical antecedents, including (1) the view from principal-agent and
13. This critique is based on some assumptions about the objectives of PPT work. First, it may be
argued that "positive" theory by definition purports to be neither descriptive nor prescriptive, and that
these criticisms are therefore beside the point. If PPT models do not claim to be descriptive-that is, to
represent or illuminate real agency policy-making processes-then they do little to advance our
understanding of the political control issue. Like Mashaw, I will assume that PPT does aspire to explain
real world agency policy-making, an assumption which is supported by PPT theorists' use of examples
and empirical data from real world agencies to buttress their theoretical arguments. See Mashaw, supra
note 12, at 288. Second, an alternative defense of PPT against this kind of critique is the commonly cited
axiom of the positivist philosophy of science that attacking a model's assumptions does little to advance
knowledge; and that we ought to judge the value of a model by the accuracy of its predictions, something
that ought to be tested empirically. However, because many political phenomena are not easily amenable
to definitive empirical challenge, this positivist axiom would have the effect of insulating many positive
models from direct challenge at all. I will proceed on the assumption that this is not a satisfactory state of
affairs. If we credit positive models of political phenomena with producing interesting results in the
absence of empirical support (which 1, for one, do), we ought not to consider those models invulnerable
to all but systematic empirical attack. Positive models can clarify that which we suspect is true and can
illuminate the hidden; therein lies their appeal. Where apparently interesting and important results are
derived from faulty assumptions, those assumptions ought to be assailable. Such is the case with the
positive theory of agency control. Positivism is a relatively recent import into political science from
economics and, before that, the natural sciences. For a discussion of positivism in physics, see generally
ISAAC AsIMov, UNDERSTANDING PHYSICS (1988). For a discussion of positivism in economics, see
generally DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985). For a discussion of positivism
in law, see Avery Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229
(1996). Thanks to Lloyd Cohen of George Mason University for helping me to clarify these points.
Finally, as to the question of whether positive arguments can be said to carry a normative bias, there
seems to be a bias in the current PPT debate in favor of greater political control by elected politicians. See
discussion infra Part III. To the extent that PPT theorists acknowledge and accept the proposition that
the public interest may be better served by less political control over agency policy-making rather than
more, the arguments I raise in Part Ill are redundant or unnecessary. However, to the extent that this bias
exists and remains implicit within the debate, it is worth re-examining now.
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science of administration models that agencies merely implement the policy
choices of elected politicians, (2) the view of some organization theorists that
there is no useful distinction to be made between agency policy-making and
agency policy implementation, and (3) the economics of regulation view that
policy-making by self-interested bureaucrats tends not to benefit the interests
of the general public.
A. Tracing the Lineage of PPT Models
The earliest models of the administrative process stressed the value of
public administrators as guardians of the public interest, technical experts
insulated from political influence by civil service rules, practitioners of the
science of administration. 14 Growing out of widespread public distrust of
elected politicians during the progressive era, this view of administrators
turned the republican principle on its head by classifying political control
over administrative agencies as a threat to the public interest. While policy-
making was the rightful province of politicians, administration of that policy
was not; indeed, political interference in administration was seen as counter-
productive.'
5
The popularity of the science of administration model peaked before
World War 11.16 Since then, however, it has been challenged on several fronts.
One such challenge came from sociology's organization theory and focused
on the constraints that prevent the bureaucrat from fulfilling the role of
dispassionate technocrat, 17 including both the limits of human cognition and
14. Some of the most famous proponents of this "rational, dispassionate bureaucrat" view were
Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Max Weber. See FRANK GOODNOW, POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION (1900); Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (Jay M.
Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds., 1978); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q.
197 (1887). This view had a contemporaneous private sector counterpart: the "scientific management"
movement in the study of business organizations. That movement was most closely associated with the
work of Frederick Taylor, and. was sometimes called "Taylorism." See Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific
Management, in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, supra, at 15.
15. In Wilson's words:
We have enthroned public opinion .... [tihe very fact that we have realized popular rule in its
fulness [sic] has made the task of organizing that rule just so much the more difficult....
Civil-service reform ... is clearing the moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the
sanctity of public office as a public trust, and, by making the service unpartisan, it is opening
the way for making it business like.
Wilson, supra note 14, at 207, 210.
16. William F. West has chronicled the rise and fall of the science of administration model, which
he calls the "traditional model." WILLIAM F. WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS IN THEORY ANt) PRACTICE 5-8 (1995).
17. Prominent works in this tradition include Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. I (1972); Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of Muddling
Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959); and Herbert A. Simon, The Proverbs of Administration, 6
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 53 (1946). For a good review of this literature and its more modemcounterparts, see
WOOD & WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY
13-26 (1995); John Brehm & Scott Gates. Working, Shirking and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a
Democratic Public I - I1 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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decision-making ability8 and contextual constraints, such as information
limitations and organizational complexity.'
9
A second challenge to the science of administration model was launched
by the direct precursors of the current PPT literature, economists and others
who used a principal-agent framework to analyze the relationship between
administrative agencies and elected politicians.20 While the principal-agent
model shared with the science of administration model the view that
politicians ought to make policy, it challenged the latter's conception of
bureaucrats. Rather than assuming bureaucrats to be politically neutral
administrators guided only by their expertise and the desire to serve the public
interest, proponents of the principal-agent model instead characterized
bureaucrats as rational, self-interested individuals whose faithfulness to their
legislative mandate could be neither assumed nor trusted.21 Proponents of the
principal-agent model used this assumption to analyze the impact of the
agency's information advantages on the relationship between the agency and
elected politicians. Based on their analysis, they concluded that information
asymmetries enabled the agency to shirk its legislatively-imposed duties. 22
For several reasons, these early works had little to say about agency
policy-making per se. Neither the science of administration model nor early
principal-agent models explicitly recognized the delegation of policy-making
functions to agencies. The science of administration model was based on the
notion that Congress retained policy-making authority, delegating to
administrative agencies only the authority to implement those policies. 23 For
its part, organization theory examined agency choices, but denied the ability
18. See Lindblom, supra note 17, at 88.
19. See Simon, supra note 17, at 65-67.
20. Prominent examples of this literature include WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY
AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of
Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCl. 3 (1971). For an update of this literature, see generally THE BUDGET-
MAxIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (Andre Blais & Stephane Dion eds., 1991)
[hereinafter BUDGET MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT].
2 1. This literature is similar to and indeed part of the "economics of regulation" literature
discussed supra note 4. That literature comprises studies of legislation and agency policy-making as the
product of self-interested or rent-seeking behavior by interest groups, and includes some versions of the
hypothesis that agencies can become "captured" by the industries they are charged with regulating. See,
e.g., Stigler, supra note 20; Peltzman, supra note 20. This literature is a relative of PPT in that they both
apply the tools of economics to the study of political phenomena.
22. See, e.g., NISKANEN, supra note 20.
23. See WEST, supra note 16, at 5-8. Courts perpetuated this myth with the "nondelegation
doctrine," which implied that Congress made the law while agencies merely served as "transmission belts
for attaining policy objectives articulated in the legislative process." Id. For a good discussion of the
nondelegation doctrine, cases thereunder, and the doctrine's continuing importance, see BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 78-119 (3d ed. 1988). Finally, it is important to
recognize the relationship between this issue and the science of administration scholars' antipathy toward
control by politicians. Neither Wilson nor Weber advocated independent policy-making by agencies;
rather, each advocated noninterference by politicians in agency administration, in part because they saw
administration as distinct from policy-making. See Weber, supra note 14; Wilson, supra note 14.
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of agencies to pursue identified policy goals; 24 indeed, some organization
theorists denied the importance of policy choices in the first instance,
choosing instead to define agency policy-making as the product of individual
acts of policy implementation rather than any conscious policy choice. 5
Likewise, early principal-agent models also tended to focus on non-policy-
making functions, or to treat all forms of agency "drift" or "shirking" as one
and the same problem.
For example, economist William Niskanen modeled the relationship
between an agency and Congress as a constrained optimization problem in
which the agency seeks to maximize its budget (B), subject to the constraint
that the budget must cover the agency's costs of producing the requisite level
of output (Q). 26 In Niskanen's model, the agency is rent-seeking-that is, it is
motivated not by ideology or policy goals but rather by the desire to pad its
own pockets. Agency output, Q, is a quantifiable amount of some good that
the agency provides, such as the level of provision of a public service or the
degree of enforcement of some rule or policy. Niskanen demonstrated that the
agency will be capable of commanding more of B than is necessary to provide
the desired amount of Q.27 The important point, however, is that the provision
of Q is not policy-making; rather, it is policy implementation. 28 An agency's
choice of a policy rule (with which the principal may be unhappy) and its
decision not to adhere to a rule established by the principal are two different
things.2 9 These early economic models of agency action presupposed the
existence of a policy or organizational goal, and thus need to be distinguished
24. See, e.g., Lindblom, supra note 17, at 83. Actually, Lindblorn denies that agencies can pursue
their goals directly. Rather, he says, agencies can move toward identified goals, but only incrementally.
Id1.
25. A more recent example of this view is MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:
DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). See also Brehm & Gates, supra note 17, at
4.
26. See NISKANEN, supra note 20, at 120-22.
27. Id. This view of bureaucrats as "resource maximizers" is part of a large literature on
budgeting and the size of government. A prominent source in this literature is AARON WILDAVSKY, THE
POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed. 1984).
28. There is also a substantial literature that arose in response to Niskanen's model and that
addresses the same dependent variable-agency "output" levels. Indeed, nearly every empirical study
examining the political control issue uses some measure of agency output (such as rates or distribution of
agency enforcement actions, inspections, etc.) as the dependent variable. On the theoretical side, Miller
and Moe sought to modify Niskanen's model by adding the notion of committee oversight, concluding
that the legislature can often get more agency output per budget dollar than Niskanen's model suggests.
Gary J. Miller & Terry M. Moe, Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government, 77 Am. POL. SCI.
REV. 297 (1983)., See also Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic
Politics, 79 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 755 (1985); Jonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, Agenda Control,
onmittee Capture, and the Dynamics of Institutional Politics, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1187 (1986);
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).
29. Similarly, much of the empirical literature on "shirking" focuses on agency or bureaucrat
decisions (some discretionary, some not) which fall outside of the realm of policy choice as defined here.
See, e.g., WOOD & WATERMAN. supra note 17; Brehm & Gates, supra note 17.
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from models that purport to explain the content of agency-made policy.30
In large part, the PPT debate of the last fifteen years was triggered by
these early economic models of agency independence, and it is important to
be clear about exactly how the more recent scholarship parts company with its
ancestors. As explained below, more recent PPT scholarship improves upon
earlier economic models by attempting to address the agency policy-making
process (at least in theory), and by depicting agencies as "policy maximizers"
rather than "resource maximizers." Indeed, as political scientists and legal
scholars have joined this discussion, more attention has been focused on
agencies' policy choices, though there remains disagreement over who
controls those choices. Furthermore, early economic models portrayed agency
independence as both a threat to the public interest, and a problem endemic to
the delegation of legislative authority. As I explain in Part 111, much of the
current PPT literature seems to challenge only the latter proposition, and
implicitly to accept the former. That challenge focused initially on the
possibility of "ex post" political control over agency decisions-the prospect
that agency policy choices might be vetoed or overturned by Congress or the
President. Most recently, the focus has turned to "ex ante" controls-prior
limits on agency policy choice imposed by Congress through legislation, or
by the President.
B. Theories of Ex Post Control
In a series of articles published in the mid 1980s, a group of positive
theory scholars from political science and economics advanced the so-called
"congressional-dominance hypothesis," which answered arguments like
Niskanen's by emphasizing the considerable tools of influence available to
Congress in its dealings with agencies. 31 The earliest incarnation of this
hypothesis stressed Congress's ability to use ex post oversight to control
agency policy-making through the selective application of legislative rewards
and sanctions to bureaucrats. This argument emphasized two types of ex post
control. These were "police patrols" (monitoring agency activities by
oversight committees) and "fire alarms" (congressional reliance on
30. This difference in perspective may reflect, in part, a disagreement over which aspect of agency
activity is most important. It is true, of course, that policy choices mean little if the chosen policies are
not applied or enforced by front-line bureaucrats. This is a fundamental tenet of the study of public
management. On the other hand, policy choices are important in their own right: they define that which
front-line bureaucrats may apply or enforce, or that from which they may shirk. Furthermore, conscious
policy choices represent the product of an enormous amount of agency effort and activity and have
profound effects on American social and economic life.
31. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 2 AM. J. POL. SC. 165 (1984); Barry R. Weingast &
Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?: Regulatory Policymaking by the
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECoN. 765 (1983).
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constituents to voice their discontent with agency actions). 32 Congressional-
dominance scholars argued that because Congress can overturn agency action
and cut agency budgets, police patrols are effective. They also argued that, in
practice, fire alarms rarely go off because bureaucrats are constrained in their
behavior by the knowledge that Congress can punish them.
33
In response to this congressional-dominance argument, political scientist
Terry Moe advanced his own president-centered view of agency policy-
making, which I will refer to as the "presidential-dominance hypothesis."
34
The central tenet of this hypothesis is that the President is both more
motivated and better able than Congress to exercise control over the
bureaucracy.35 Part of Moe's argument emphasizes ex post controls. He notes
that agency policies must pass by the President and his appointees on their
way to formal passage, and that the President can centralize the decision-
making process by imposing new procedural rules. The classic example of
centralization is regulatory review, a strategy begun by the Carter
Administration, and intensified by the OMB during the Reagan
Administration 36  and the Competitiveness Council during the Bush
Administration.
PPT scholars recognized that these theories of ex post political control
lent themselves nicely to formal spatial models of agency policy choice as a
sequential, full-information game. 37 Most of these formal models conceive of
32. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 165-66. The ex post/ex ante distinction can
become a bit muddied in this literature. As explained in greater detail below, these tools of ex post
control are alleged to have ex ante effect-that is, they constrain agency choices, informally, before those
choices are made. Nevertheless, the tools of control are used, if at all, after the agency's decision.
Furthermore, I am distinguishing here between "fire alarms" (appeals by constituents to Congress) as
instruments of ex post control, and the provision of procedural remedies to constituents for use before
agencies or the courts. I classify the latter as a form of ex ante control. See discussion infra Section I.C.
33. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 31, at 166-67; Weingast & Moran, supra note 31, at
777-79, 792-93.
34. Moe's critique is developed in Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of
the Story., 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213 (1987); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structural Choice: Towards a
Theory of Public Bureaucracy, Address Before the American Political Science Association Annual
Meetings (Sept. 1, 1988) (transcript on file with author). The presidential-dominance hypothesis is
alluded to in these sources, but is most fully developed in Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents
and Political Structure, 1994 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1. I should note that Moe might eschew the
positive-theorist label. I include him here because he is an important participant in the PPT debate, and
because his presidential-dominance argument mirrors the PPT congressional-dominance argument.
Indeed, both arguments suffer from some of the same shortcomings. See discussion infra Part 11.
35. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 34, at 11-13.
36. See id. at 37-42.
37. Of course, the reduction of arguments to formal models or games is common in economic
analysis and in PPT. Some prominent examples from this literature are William N. Eskridge & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn,
Article 1, Section 7]; William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the
Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
165 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick]; John A. Ferejohn & Charles
Shipan, Congressional Influence on the Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1990); and Arthur Lupia
& Matthew D. McCubbins, Learning From Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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agency policy-making as the product of strategic choices made by
bureaucrats, subject to reversal or veto by Congress, the President, or the
courts. For example, as shown in Figure 1, a simple one-dimensional model
38
places the key actors-the agency (A), the unicameral legislature (H), and the
legislature's oversight committee (C) in this example-at different points (or
ideal points) on a spectrum of policy choice. 39
Figure 1
I I I [policy
A C(H) C H dimension
SQ
The "full-information" assumption means that each actor is aware of the
policy options and of the others' preferences and likely actions. The rules of
this game provide that the legislature can overturn the agency's choice of
policy, but only the committee can propose legislation. Therefore, the
legislature can produce the outcome it wants (its ideal point) only if the
committee proposes legislation in the first place. Knowing this, the agency
will only propose policies which will not provoke a legislative proposal
overruling the agency's choice. The policy at point C(H), which is the same
distance from C as H is from C, represents just such a policy.4° In this way,
politicians' preferences and the threat of an ex post veto constrain agency
policy choices. Other, more nuanced models of ex post control employ this
38. This example is drawn from Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 37, at 5-9.
39. Each actor is assumed to try to maximize its utility over policy outcomes and to have "single-
peaked preferences," or a single-peaked utility function over this range of policy choices. The ideal points
represent the location of each actor's preferred policy option, or point of highest utility for each actor
(actually, in this example points C and H represent the ideal points of the median member of the
committee and the legislature, respectively.) In other words, it is assumed that policy options are ordered
along this spectrum of choice such that each actor's utility declines for each option that is further away
from her ideal point. Therefore, under these assumptions, the desirability of each point on the spectrum of
choice is inversely related to its distance from the actor's ideal point. For an explanation of the
significance of the assumption of single-peakedness for models of this kind, see FROHLICH &
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 3, at 119-24.
40. In this game, the agency moves first by selecting a policy, after which the committee may
propose a new policy if it so chooses. To see why the agency will choose policy C(H), remember that the
committee will move only if it would prefer the legislature's ideal point to the policy selected by the
agency, and that the agency will seek to avoid that outcome. For a more detailed explanation of this
process, see Ferejohn & Shipan supra note 37, at 12-15. Ferejohn and Shipan first explore the
implications of this basic model, later adding judicial review, presidential veto, and legislative override
mechanisms to their model. They conclude among other things, that (1) a partnership between an
outlying committee and a like-minded agency can sometimes frustrate the will of the legislature under the
basic model, and (2) judicial review increases the agency's responsiveness to legislative preferences (to
those of the current legislature, not the legislature which authorized the agency to act). For an evaluation
and critique of Ferejohn and Shipan's model, see Matthew L. Spitzer, Extensions of Ferejohn and
Shipan's Model ofAdministrative Agency Behavior, 6 J.L ECON. & ORG. 29 (1990).
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same basic approach, and most also describe a high degree of political control
over agency policy choices. 4'
C. Theories of Ex Ante Control
Criticism of this congressional-dominance argument has led some of its
proponents to shift their focus to Congress's ability to exert ex ante control
over agency policy-making. The "structure and process" hypothesis,
advocated in the "McNollgast" articles, 42 emphasizes congressional use of
enabling legislation to shape the agency policy-making process.43 According
to this view, Congress does this in three ways: (1) by providing for interest
group representation in the administrative process; (2) by "stacking the deck"
in favor of the enacting coalition by specifying how the statute will be
implemented; and (3) by structuring the agency so that it tends to favor
41. See generally Eskridge & Ferejohn, Article I, Section 7, supra note 37, at 558 (contending
that President enjoys advantages in struggle to exert ex post (and ex ante) control over agencies).
Eskridge and Ferejohn explore how broad delegations of authority to agencies can inure to the benefit of
the President in the absence of legislative vetoes or court enforcement of the nondelegations doctrine. See
also Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 37 (exploring some conditions under which legislators will use
police patrols versus fire alarms, as well as circumstances under which legislators can learn from
oversight). Lupia and McCubbins conclude that (1) because any costly agency policy proposal will
involve a large change from the status quo, and because legislators have the ability to use police patrols
to learn about proposed policies, the agency will only propose large changes from the status quo that
benefit the legislator, and (2) legislators can learn from fire alarms when those sounding the fire alarm
face some sort of penalty for lying and have preferences similar to those of the legislator.
It is worth noting that PPT scholars have long appreciated the ability of the agency to exercise
autonomy when multiple principals disagree. Mashaw's two-dimensional model explores how agencies
can sometimes play political principals off against one another to maximize preferred policy outcomes.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Games,
Management and Accountability, 1994 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185. See also Thomas H. Hammond
& Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Prominence,
Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policymaking, 12 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 119 (1996) (explaining when a bureaucracy will have autonomy); McCubbins et al.,
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV.- 431, 435-38 (1989) (exploring problem of controlling bureaucratic agents).
My critique focuses not on this problem but on the reasons why the tools of control available to each
principal are often ineffective irrespective of any disagreement among the principals.
42. See Matthew McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 253-64 (1987); McCubbins et al., supra note 41. "McNollgast" are
Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast.
43. This is essentially a problem presented by the divergence between the agency's policy
preferences not from those of the current Congress, but from those of the enacting Congress. Horn and
Shepsle argue that the enacting Congress can only limit agency drift in this way by exposing agency
policy-making to the problem of "legislative" or "coalitional drift," "that is, by exposing the agency to
greater outside influence in the future." Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary,
Administrative Arrangements and Political Control of Agencies: Administrative Process and Form as
Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 504-07 (1989). Macey disputes this
contention. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 95-99 (1992).
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particular interests ("autopilot" characteristics). 44 The "structure" part of this
argument, encompassing the last two of these three items, focuses on the
initial decisions politicians make at the legislative stage about the agency's
structure or mission, such as the agency's location within the executive
branch, its likely client group, its organizational structure, etc. The "process"
part of this argument focuses on Congress's ability to establish ex ante
procedural rights for the "enacting coalition ' 45 (item one above) to participate
in agency policy-making. Proponents of ex ante control contend that these
rights, combined with the original structural choices and ex post oversight,
can help to ensure that the enacting coalition's goals will be enforced by
interest groups-through the courts if necessary-in the agency policy-
making process.46
In response to the ex ante congressional control argument, Moe argues
that presidents exert more ex ante control over agency policy-making than
does Congress, noting that presidents are endowed with Constitutional and
statutory powers which enable them to control agency structure.47 The power
of appointment is the most important power, because presidents can use this
power to place political appointees in key agency positions-a process known
as "infiltrating alien territory. 4 8 Moe buttresses his claim that presidents can
control agency policy-making in ways Congress cannot by noting both that
the President oversees the regulatory review process and that the President
can set the public agenda and thereby frame policy debates. The latter power
is especially important in that it can act as an indirect constraint on Congress'
ability to influence agency policy-making.
49
The ex ante control argument engaged legal scholars in the PPT debate
and did so by design. The McNollgast argument that administrative
procedures were instruments of political control challenged legal scholars'
traditional view of administrative procedures as a means to democratize, and
therefore to legitimize, the agency policy-making process. 50 Similarly, Moe's
analysis of presidential control of agencies referred to a large existing
literature in the legal scholarship that had been triggered by the Reagan
44. McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 256-64. Macey's explanation of how agencies are
"hardwired" is essentially a more nuanced version of McNollgast's notion of "autopilot" characteristics.
See Macey, supra note 43, at 99-103.
45. The enacting coalition is the coalition of interest groups who supported the enabling
legislation.
46. McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 263.
47. Moe & Wilson, supra note 34, at 13-15.
48. Id. at 17-19.
49. Id.
50. See Mashaw, supra note 12, at 267-70. Mashaw characterizes the traditional view as the
"idealist vision" of administrative procedures and describes the PPT approach as one type of "realist
critique" of that vision. id. For two of the better known expositions of the more traditional view of
administrative procedures, see KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-10 (1972); Richard B.
Stewart, The Reformation of Anerican Administrative Law. 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1715-16 (1975).
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Administration's Executive Order 12291.51 Some legal scholars did embrace
the PPT approach and even more joined the debate.52 Nevertheless most
scholars ascribed greater ex ante control to the President than to Congress.
53
As shown in Figure 2, the politics of structure argument can be expressed
very simply in a one-dimensional spatial model. Given that the President and
Congress have preferences over a policy issue, they will select an agency with
a preference for, or create an agency designed to pursue, the policy at Point A.
Figure 2
I I I policy
A dimension
David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran54 and Karen Bawn55 offer more
complicated formal models of this ex ante control process by examining
Congress's assessment of how much policy-making discretion to delegate to
agencies. Epstein and O'Halloran contend that legislatively established limits
on agency policy choice are consciously and strategically chosen by
Congress, based upon Congress's determination of the other actors' policy
preferences.56 In their model, the amount of discretion Congress delegates
decreases as the amount of distance between congressional and presidential
ideal points increases because presidents can influence agency policy-making
within the parameters set by Congress. Its tools of ex post control enable
Congress to grant some minimum amount (or "floor") of discretion regardless
of presidential preferences.57 Bawn models legislators' choice of whether to
delegate policy issues or to address them legislatively as a function of the
actors' preferences and outcome uncertainty. She contends that legislators can
use structure and process not to dictate the agency's ideal point (as in Figure
5 I. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 10; Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era
of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Cl-. L. REV. 123 (1994); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Deregulation and
Reregulation: Rhetoric and Reality, 6 J.L. & POL. 287 (1989); Peter L. Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The
Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986); Cass Sunstein,
The Myth of the Unitary Executive, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 299 (1993).
52. Examples include Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 37; Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers
and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992);
Macey, supra note 43.
53. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, Article 1, Section 7, supra note 37, at 563; Greene, supra note
51, at 196.
54. See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency
Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 697 (1994).
55. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Agency Expertise: Congressional Choices About
Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995).
56. Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 54, at 704-06.
57. Id. at 708-12.
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2) but to dictate the characteristics of the distribution from which it is drawn,
and thereby to dictate the agency's likely ideal point.
58
R. PPT Methodology and the Limits of Political Control
PPT models provide insight into how Congress or the President
sometimes attempts to influence agency policy-making. However, as I explain
in this Section, these models exaggerate politicians' ability to manage the
delegation of policy-making authority to agencies. Commonly used PPT
assumptions about preference structures and information tend to overstate the
leverage politicians have over agency policy-making and to obscure some of
the basic reasons why politicians have no choice but to delegate policy-
making authority to agency experts in the first place. As a consequence, the
picture painted by most PPT models does not accurately represent most
agency policy-making-a process which is dominated more often by agency
bureaucrats pursuing their goals than by external forces.
Before these observations can be further developed, two caveats must be
presented. First, some of the variables that PPT models (particularly formal
models) continue to ignore-such as asymmetries in information and
resources-are some of the variables on which earlier economic models
focused. Ironically, while PPT scholarship grew out of this earlier work, it
does not seem to have fully appreciated its implications. Second, there is a
distinction to be made between (1) those PPT models that describe issue-by-
issue policy control by politicians over agency choices and (2) those that
explain broad policy-making discretion by agencies as a function of strategic
choices by politicians that serve their policy goals. 59 While the latter
acknowledges that agencies have broad policy-making discretion, both
ascribe ultimate policy control to elected politicians. I argue that, more often
than not, neither form of political control is present when agencies make
policy decisions.
A. Structure, Process and Ex Ante Control
The ex ante control argument understates or ignores (1) the importance of
legislative foresight to the exercise of influence over subsequent agency
policy decisions, (2) certain reasons why politicians cannot and do not
structure agency decisions in the ways the ex ante control arguments suggest,
58. In Bawn's model, the legislative coalition uses procedures to specify the mean and the
variance of the distribution of agency preferences. Bawn, supra note 55, at 63.
59. Examples of the latter include Bawn's model, supra note 55, and Epstein and O'Halloran's
model, supra note 54. Another, similar model is proposed by Martin. Elizabeth M. Martin, The Impact of
Costly Decision Making on Congressional Delegation (Aug. 31, 1995) (unpublished paper presented
before 1995 meeting of American Political Science Association, on file with author).
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and (3) the ways agencies can evade political control by using informal or
other policy-making procedures that exclude interest group input.
i. Preferences, "Legislative Bargain," and the Problem of Foresight
The simple politics of structure illustration in Figure 2 presupposes
presidential and congressional preferences over the policy issue in question,
implying foresight of that issue at the legislative stage. It may be that the
spatial depiction of this "structural choice" is appropriate for some of the
policy issue dimensions that politicians can foresee. Yet, as an agency
encounters new policy problems and issue dimensions within its jurisdiction,
the preferences of agency experts may or may not reflect those of elected
politicians. Figure 3 illustrates a problem in which the President and Congress
have created an agency designed to produce policy Xa on the first issue
dimension, an issue that the President and Congress were able to foresee at
the agency creation stage. However, as the agency encounters additional issue
dimensions like that represented by the vertical axis in Figure 3, its
preferences may begin to reflect influences other than those of Congress or
the President.60 When the enabling legislation is silent, agencies do not
merely attempt to read and implement the preferences of Congress and the
President. Rather, legislation authorizes agency experts to apply their
expertise to new problems, subject to specified constraints. The agency's
policy preferences will be, in part, a function of that expertise. Congress and
the President recognize that they cannot foresee many important policy issues
and that their ability to exercise ex ante influence is, therefore, limited. For
these unforeseen issues, there is no legislative bargain to enforce. This
foreseeability problem goes to the heart of the delegation issue and is the key
reason why politicians delegate policy-making authority to agencies in the
first place.6'
60. Thanks to William Bianco for suggesting this illustration.
61. This "issue foreseeability" phenomenon is analogous to but distinguishable from "outcome
uncertainty"-the notion that legislators cannot foresee the policy outcomes that result from legislative
action and the "potential preferences" of their constituents over those outcomes. Outcome uncertainty
and its effects on the legislator-constituent relationship.are addressed in R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE
I OGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 35-87 (1991); and WILLIAM T. BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES
AND CONSTITUENTS (1994). Both Bawn and Epstein & O'Halloran attempt to incorporate outcome
uncertainty into their formal models of the delegation process; neither, however, makes any allowance for
issue foreseeability. To the contrary, both model the delegation process as a function of politicians'
known preferences over policy outcomes, implying that politicians can foresee issues. See Bawn, supra
note 55, at 64; Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 54, at 703-04. McCubbins et al. acknowledge the
importance of issue foreseeability in the ex ante control argument, but contend that the full panoply of ex
ante and ex post control devices available to politicians, taken together, gives politicians a substantial
amount of political control over agencies. See McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 257. See also Macey,
supra note 43, at 99 (acknowledging importance of issue foreseeability problem).
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Proponents of ex ante control contend that politicians can exert a good
measure of influence over subsequent agency decisions, despite the
foreseeability problem, by using structures and procedures to favor the
winning legislative coalition at the agency policy-making stage. Recall that
the structure portion of this argument says that decisions about agency
structure that politicians make at the agency or program-creation stage
constrain subsequent agency policy choices. 62 However, structural choices
like these are infrequently made (new legislative programs are relatively rare,
and agencies are very infrequently created or restructured).63 In addition,
many important intervening variables exist between the original structural
choice and the agency policy choices that follow it. For these reasons,
structural choice is at best a very blunt instrument of influence.
That is not to say that structural choice is meaningless-rather, that its
importance as a determinant of agency policy choice is seriously overstated. It
is one thing to say that structural choices about the agency's jurisdiction and
mission influence the agency's subsequent policy preferences. 64 It is quite
another to contend that structure influences most agency policy choices.
Indeed, a more circumspect and persuasive version of the structural choice
argument is consistent with well-established works from outside the PPT
62. See Bawn, supra note 55, at 63-69; McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 440-45.
63. Structural choices are made infrequently, and most are made by the enacting Congress. This
makes structural choices particularly susceptible to the "legislative drift" problem discussed at supra note
43.
64. See Macey, supra note 43, at 99-104.
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tradition that describe how an agency can become populated by bureaucrats
with certain shared values. For example, Kaufman65 and Marcus 66 have noted
that an agency with a well-defined mission will tend to attract bureaucrats
whose goals are sympathetic to that mission. Consequently, the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Office of Water tends to attract
people who place a high value on protecting water quality, while the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) Office of Hydropower Licensing
tends to attract people who place a high value on encouraging the
development of hydroelectric power. Politicians' structural choices can
therefore point the agency toward a general goal. Nevertheless, agencies must
face many policy choices while attaining that goal which are orthogonal to the
original structural choice (as shown in Figure 3). For these policy choices,
factors unrelated to the original structural choice-bureaucrats' technical
expertise, professional norms, or the influence of the relevant policy
network-will determine the agency's policy preferences. Consider the FERC
hydroelectric licensing example mentioned above. Congress has made very
few structural choices affecting the program since the passage of the Federal
Power Act in 1935.67 Yet the FERC has made countless policy decisions
about how to achieve its goals during that time. These aging structural
choices exerted little influence over decisions profoundly affecting national
energy and environmental policy. 6
8
Similarly, the process portion of the structure and process argument
seems overstated and equates openness in the administrative process with
congressional influence over that process. However, absent a specific
expression of legislative intent governing the agency policy choice in
question, procedural rights cannot ensure ex ante influence over that policy
choice because most administrative procedures are substantively neutral.69
65. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1967).
66. ALFRED MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (1980).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 791 (a) (1994). The first and only major amendment to the hydroelectric licensing
provisions of the Federal Power Act was contained in the 1986 Electric Consumers Protection Act, Pub.
L. 99-495, 100 Stat. 1243 (1986).
68. For example, political scientist Jeffrey Hill describes how the FERC circumvented or ignored
important parts of the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), a policy choice which he
credits to the dominance of lawyers in the agency decision-making process. Jeffrey S. Hill, Agency
Latitude and Congressional Control: An Alternative to Capture and Dominance 197-213 (1987)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, on file with author). Perhaps a better example
of the dominating influence of professional norms over congressional goals is the Clean Air Act example
described in Subsection I1.A.2.
69. Indeed, those procedural provisions which have real substantive effect, such as those assigning
the burden of proof in subsequent agency proceedings, might reasonably be classified as "quasi-
substantive" rather than procedural. Whereas McCubbins et al. ascribe substantive effect to procedures
which increase the transaction costs of agency decision-making, these more quasi-substantive procedures
tend to raise the costs of making a particular decision. For example, McCubbins et al. discusses how the
different burdens of proof assigned to proponents and opponents of new toxic chemicals in the Toxic
Substances Control Act have made it much easier for environmental opponents of new toxic chemicals to
be successful under the latter statute than the former. McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 260. This kind
of provision alters the substantive status quo and might be considered more than "procedural."
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PPT scholars point to the notice and comment procedures required by the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as an example of a procedural control
device; yet, depending on the substantive standards governing conflict over
policy-making at the agency or court stage, disfavored interests (those which
were not part of the enacting coalition) may be just as able as favored
interests to use procedure to influence agency policy-making. 70 This point is
illustrated by Steven.Balla, who found that notice and comment rule-making
procedures used by the Health Care Financing Administration benefited the
opponents of the coalition that supported the enabling legislation.71 Indeed, in
the usual absence of legislative guidance, the ex ante procedural control
argument seems weak.72
How often are agency policy choices guided by legislative intent? The
answer to this question is a point of contention among PPT scholars.73 In the
legislative process, Congress makes many important policy choices that place
boundaries on agency action. These legislative boundaries influence agency
action more effectively than ex post controls because agency bureaucrats
almost always respect these boundaries. 74 However, even if legislatively
imposed limits are commonly included in statutes, Congress does not
necessarily impose limits on most agency policy choices. The number of
policy issues addressed in legislation is a small fraction of the number
addressed by agencies.
In addition, Congress is often silent on important policy questions that
are left to the agency to resolve.75 Returning to the hydroelectric licensing
70. In response to this procedural control argument, Mashaw has noted that statutes do not
typically enfranchise only the winning coalition. See Mashaw, supra note 12, at 281-84. Macey argues
that courts often tailor rules of standing to benefit those who were the losers at the legislative stage. See
Macey, supra note 52, at 684-92.
71. See Steven J. Bala, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 15 (Apr. 18, 1996).
Likewise, Coglianese demonstrates that business interests participate disproportionately in EPA
hazardous waste rule-makings, yet were not the intended beneficiaries of the statute under which those
rules were promulgated. See Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the
Administrative Process 47-51 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
72. Even procedures that grant access to previously excluded groups may have little substantive
influence on policy outcomes. One frequently cited example of a procedural control device is the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(d) (1994), which gave environmental groups
and environmental issues greater exposure in the administrative process. See, e.g., McCubbins et al.,
supra note 42, at 264. However, NEPA is generally understood to have had little substantive effect on
agency decisions, except for the increased transaction costs due to NEPA compliance that may effectively
kill marginal agency projects. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 44-48
(1978).
73. Compare Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 37, at 3 (suggesting that vague delegations of
policy-making authority to agencies is the norm) with Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 54, at 701
(suggesting the opposite).
74. Traditional bureaucratic politics or public administration scholars might attribute this response
to a bureaucrat's sense of professionalism. See, e.g., MEIER, supra note 9, at chs. 5, 7; ROHR, supra note
9, at ch. 1I. PPT scholars might point to other incentives, such as the fact that interest groups are likely
to enforce ex ante boundaries through the courts. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 263.
75. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis notes that agencies are left to "decide many major questions"
of policy. See DAVIS, supra note 50, at 35. He characterizes the delegation process this way: "Congress
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example, the Federal Power Commission (later renamed the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission) was charged for more than five decades with
granting hydroelectric licenses to those applicants whose projects will serve
"the public interest." The Commission was left with the task of givingn""76
meaning to that standard. Similarly, the 1980 federal Superfund law left
unanswered important questions about how hazardous waste sites were to be
cleaned up and by whom. 77 It is the inability of politicians to foresee
important policy choices that makes vague delegations like these relatively
common, hinddring the ability of favored interest groups to translate
procedural access into policy success.
2. Collective Choice Problems and "Passing the Buck"
Collective choice problems further illustrate why delegation to agency
experts can be useful politically rather than strategically, and why delegations
are frequently vague, even when Congress can foresee policy issues that may
arise. Congress delegates important issues to the agency because of (1)
preference cycles within Congress over the policy issue in question and (2)
what William Riker called the "manipulation of alternatives. ' 'T Preference
cycles refer to collectively intransitive preferences that can occur when there
are more than two policy alternatives, such as when a legislative body prefers
alternative A to alternative B, B to C, and C to A.79 Manipulation of
alternatives can be used to create cycles over one issue dimension, as can
manipulation of issue dimensions within a single legislative proposal-it may
be that preferences are single peaked over one issue but not over two or
more. 80 These problems can defuse or frustrate a majority and prevent
Congress from making a policy choice in the enabling legislation, even when
it can foresee the issue. For example, a strong majority of legislators and
voters may support the proposition that women should have a right to an
abortion; but, there may be no majority in support of any set of specific
abortion restrictions, such as parental consent, waiting periods and the like.
may say to the agency, in effect: 'Here is the problem. Deal with it.. . . . The non-delegation doctrine
does not prevent delegation of legislative power.... And it does not even assure meaningful legislative
standards." Id. at 27.
76. See 16 U.S.C. § 800 (1994).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994). Environmental statutes are often cited as examples of legislative
specificity. Yet even the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1994), and the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1251 (1994), despite their complexity and length, charged EPA (and delegated state agencies) with much
of the task of determining which emitters of pollution to regulate and how to regulate them. For
additional examples, see DAVIS, supra note 50, at 26-41.
78. See generally WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION
BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 140-41 (1982).
79. This is a violation of the assumption used in formal models of single-peaked preferences. The
significance of single-peaked preferences is described at supra note 39 and infra note 13 1. This is one
aspect of the instability of majority rule literature described at supra note 3.
80. See RIKER, supra note 78, at 137-68.
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Positive theorists are well aware of this problem but seem to understate its
importance in models of agency control. As Riker"' and others82 argue, this
type of impasse is not uncommon. More importantly, it seems likely that this
would be a particularly common problem for policy choices facing agencies
because Congress can "solve" collective choice problems by leaving
politically difficult issues for decision by the agency. The temptation to "pass
the buck" in this way means not only that agencies face many policy
questions on which legislation is silent, but also that many of these policy
questions will be important, or at least controversial.83 With these policy
choices, there is no position from which the agency can drift and, once again,
no legislative bargain to enforce.
This is essentially the problem the Supreme Court addressed in Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.84 The Court upheld the
EPA's right to reverse a prior agency policy choice (contained in agency
regulations) under the Clean Air Act in the absence of any discernible
legislative intent on the policy issue in question. The Court explained:
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike
the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be
in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the
question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a
coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side
decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.
For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred. 85
Certainly the plaintiffs in Chevron, an environmental group, were among the
members of the coalition whom the Clean Air Act intended to benefit. Both
the Clean Air Act statute and the Administrative Procedures Act afforded the
plaintiffs the right to participate in the agency policy-making process and to
seek review of agency policy decisions in court. Yet absent legislative intent
guiding the agency on the policy issue in question, the agency was free within
the bounds of reasonableness to make its own policy choices irrespective of
the wishes of the plaintiffs.86
81. Id. at213.
82. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 34, at 24-28.
83. Electoral concerns reinforce this tendency among legislators toward "nondecisions."
Representative Pat Williams (D-MT) recently put it this way: "For a number of years, Americans have
been in a negative mood, so voting no on legislation is the safest of all positions." Robin Toner, For
Democrats on the Ropes, The Best and Worst of Times, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al.
84. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85. Id. at 865.
86. It should be noted that, under the Chevron doctrine, the reviewing court must make an initial
determination whether the enacting Congress evinced an intent to guide the agency on the policy issue in
question. If the court reads an intent into the language of the statute, that intent will be controlling. Some
commentators contend that the Supreme Court has used this approach to retreat from Chevron. at least
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The Chevron decision reinforces the notion that members of the winning
coalition at the legislative stage can enforce the legislative bargain only if
procedural access is supplemented by substantive rights. Frequently, because
politicians are unwilling to address or unable to foresee the policy issues that
will arise, agency policy choice is not constrained by ex ante controls.
3. Evading Procedural Controls: Informal and Ad Hoc Policy-Making
The ex ante procedural control argument seems to contemplate agency
policy-making by notice and comment rule-making only. However, agencies
have the ability to evade procedural control in two basic ways. First, agencies
can make broad policy decisions through informal means.87 Second, agencies
can make policy on a case-by-case basis, using formal adjudication to
establish policy precedent.
If an agency wishes to establish a broad policy rule, it may choose to
avoid the APA's rule-making procedure by embodying its policy choice in
informal rules, 88 policy guidance memoranda, and other policy-making
devices. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' wetlands permitting
program relies on so-called "regulatory guidance letters" to announce policy
decisions. 89 Similarly, most of EPA's policies concerning the apportionment
of liability and cleanup standards under the Superfund program are contained
in informal directives. 90 When agencies make such policy decisions without
going through notice and comment rule-making procedures, it becomes much
more difficult for interest groups to influence the agency policy-making
process. These informal policies may not have the force of law in court, but
they are widely used by agencies as if they did. While interest groups can
challenge the validity of the policy in court, standing rules and other access
doctrines make access to the courts more restrictive than access to the rule-
making process. Furthermore, because bureaucrats and some segments of the
informally. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 10, at 980-92. To the extent that courts adopt this approach,
Congress may be able to come closer to preserving the original legislative bargain. However, this retreat
is not in evidence in the lower courts. Furthermore, Chevron is still controlling law, and it portends
increasing deference to agency policy decisions.
87. See Robert A. Anthony, 'Well, You Want the Permit, Don't You?' Agency Efforts to Make
Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 AD)MIN. L. REV. 31, 31-41 (1988). See also James T.
Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures:
The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 1994 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 111, 119-27.
88. Traditionally, legal scholars have used the term "informal rule-making" to refer to notice and
comment rule-making under Section 553 of the APA to distinguish it from more formal rule-making
procedures specified under Sections 556 and 557 of the this Act. See, e.g., JOHN REESE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRINCIPLES ANt) PRACTICE (1995). I am referring here, however, to even less
formal policy choices, those made without using notice and comment procedures.
89. See, e.g., Regulatory Guidance Letters Issued by the Corps of Engineers, 60 Fed. Reg. 13703
(1995).
90. See, e.g., NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE, DIRECTORY OF SUPERFUND
GUIl ANCE DOCUMENTS (1995).
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public seem to be growing increasingly dissatisfied with the rule-making
process, the use of informal processes seems to be on the rise. 91
Similarly, when agencies make policy by formal adjudication, interest
group access is also restricted. Policy by adjudication is a particularly
powerful technique for independent commissions, which have the authority to
use adjudicatory proceedings to make policy as a matter of course.92
Independent commissions, such as the FCC, the SEC, and the FERC, make
many of their policy determinations in quasi-judicial opinions, in which they
impose their own rules governing access to these adjudicatory proceedings93
Interest-group access to these quasi-judicial proceedings tends to be more
restricted than access to rule-makings. 94 Furthermore, these judicial policy
decisions stand as precedent until the commissioners decide to change them,
and they can do so without the cumbersome notice and comment
requirements associated with rule-making.
There is one additional variation on this theme: Sometimes new policy is
made outside the usual policy processes by courts. This outcome occurred in
a 1976 federal consent decree in which EPA settled a suit initiated by the
Natural Resources Defense Council. In the decree, EPA agreed to extend
water pollution regulation under the Clean Water Act to new chemicals and
industries. 95 Indeed, an agency can initiate enforcement proceedings, or
91. For a general discussion of this issue, see Bryan G. Tabler & Mark E. Shere, EPA's Practice
of Regulation by Memo, 5 NAT. RE-s. & ENVT. 3 (1990). Legal scholars have noted that the increasing
formality and rigidity of the notice and comment process-called the "ossification" of rule-making, PHILIP
K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW THE LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 62-89 (1994)-
has spurred the move to less formal, less open, and more flexible methods of policy-making. See Thomas
0. McGarrity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. J. 1375 (1992).
Note also that APA Section 553 requirements do not apply to so-called "interpretive rules," which the
agency may use to explain how it will interpret provisions of its enabling statute. See Sentana-Hampton
Hosp. v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 749, 751, 755-59 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In practice, the distinction between filling
in the interstices of the legislative mandate (in a substantive rule for which notice was provided) and
interpreting statutory provisions (in an interpretive rule) is not always clear. For that reason, the
interpretive rule exemption from Section 553 offers a tempting way for agencies to make policy decisions
without securing prior public comment.
92. The agency's choice between rule-making and adjudication as a means for making new policy
has garnered the attention of both courts and traditional legal scholars for quite some time. The Supreme
Court's decisions in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S. 759 (1969), establish a broad right to use adjudications to announce new policy decisions,
though the latter case purported to impose some tentative limits on that discretion. The increasing
proclivity of some independent commissions to use adjudications in lieu of rule-making has provoked
comment in the law review literature. See, e.g., Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The
Choice Between Rulemaking and Adjudication. 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149 (1986); Emerson H. Tiller &
Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Politics and Decision Costs in Administration and Judicial Process
(University of Texas at Austin Working Paper No. 96-121, 1996).
93. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (1995) (governing intervention in FERC proceedings); 17
C.F.R. pt. 200 (1995) (same).
94. See, e.g.. 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (1995).
95. See Natural.Resources Defense Council v. Train, 8 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (1976). In
his dissent from the D.C. Circuit's approval of the decree in Citizens for a Better Environment v.
Gorsuch,, 718 F.2d 1117, 1134-36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (denying a challenge by industrial plaintiffs who
were mostly excluded from the negotiations), Judge Wilkey called the decree a violation of the separation
of powers, and complained that the decree insulates the policy choice from the input of interest groups,
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intervene in or settle other judicial proceedings, with the aim of obtaining a
judicial decision that establishes or endorses the agency's new, yet
unannounced, policy choice. R. Shep Melnick describes how factions within
EPA used judicial decisions to support their policy goals in the early
implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act.9 6 More recently, several important
EPA Superfund policies were first given the force of law by judicial
decisions. 97 All these policy-making techniques limit interest group access to,
and influence over, the agency's policy choice, thereby undermining the
effectiveness of politicians' attempts to exert procedural control.
4. Presidents, Structure, and Ex Ante Control
Many of the proponents of the structure and process ex ante control
argument have also been proponents of the congressional-dominance theory.
Ironically, the argument for presidential ex ante control is less vulnerable to
many of the above criticisms. Presidents do not face collective choice
problems and need not rely on interest groups to do their bidding with the
agency. Nevertheless, the presidential-dominance argument seems overstated
in other ways.
In particular, there are important limits on the effectiveness of the
primary tool of ex ante control available to the President: the power to appoint
agency heads and thereby to "infiltrate alien territory." 98 Theoretically,
presidentially appointed agency administrators can control the agency's
policy-making agenda; however, whether that power can be translated into a
tool of influence for the President is uncertain. Absent ongoing
communication between the President and the administrator, the
administrator can do the President's bidding in the agency policy-making
process only if the administrator shares the President's ideology. Just as
Congress cannot foresee many important policy issues the agency will face,
whether the administrator will be ideologically compatible with the President
on an issue-by-issue basis is something that the President will be unable to
foresee at the time of appointment. Furthermore, many presidential
politicians, and even future EPA administrators. For a good description of this policy-making decree, see
ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS ANT) THE EPA (1993).
96. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS ch. 8 (1983).
97. For example, EPA first formally extended Superfund liability to lending institutions by way of
court decisions. See U.S. v. Fleet Factors 'Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554-60 (1 Ith Cir. 1990). EPA only
subsequently "codified" that policy in their "Lender Liability Rule." See Natural Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18344 (EPA
1992). This rule was ultimately overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court as beyond EPA's statutory
authority. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995). EPA
does not have statutory authorization to issue rules limiting a party's liability thereunder.
98. Moe and Wilson also cite regulatory review powers and the power to shape opinion as
additional tools of presidential control. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 34, at 15-I18. The President's
regulatory review power can be used as a tool of ex ante or ex post control. I discuss the limits of that
power in Section I.C. The limits of the President's opinion-shaping powers are addressed in Part Ill.
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appointments are made for reasons other than ideological compatibility, such
as to do political favors or pay political debts. In addition, political scientists
have long noted that as political appointees "grow" into the role of agency
head and acquire additional expertise in the relevant policy arena, they often
adopt the preferences and perspectives of agency careerists on policy issues
(called "going native" in the literature).99 Finally, even when an appointee's
views mirror those of the President, the ability of even the most dedicated
administrator to gain control of the agency policy-making apparatus will be a
function of the internal organization of the agency. For example, policy-
making authority is typically concentrated at the top in independent
commissions, suggesting a more potentially potent appointment power. In
contrast, decentralized agencies such as the EPA contain numerous loci of
policy-making power, many controlled by careerists, raising second-order
agency problems for the President. 10
The Reagan Administration, which may have provided the prototype for
the presidential control model, illustrates each of these points. More than any
of his predecessors, Reagan selected agency heads for their ideological
compatibility. Even this kind of concerted effort to exert ex ante control met
with mixed results. Despite Reagan's successes (at the FTC, for example),
there were notable failures and retreats as well. Reagan appointee and
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop became a voice for liberal social policies.101
The appointment of Anne Burford to head the EPA triggered a protracted
struggle over the heart and soul of environmental policy with both Congress
and other EPA bureaucrats, a struggle that ended (or for which a truce was
called) when Burford was ultimately chased from office and replaced with
EPA administrators whose policy preferences were consistently to the left of
the President's. 10 2 There are numerous other examples. 10 3 The Reagan
Administration's experience underscores the danger of concluding that the
presidential appointment power implies ex ante influence or control over
99. See, e.g., Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 106-15 (1978); RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP 43-45 (1960).
100. In his seminal analysis of EPA's implementation of the Clean Air Act, Melnick describes the
relative impotence of political appointees in several of the agency's major policy choices: "The political
executives ... were busy finding their way around the agency and putting together a package of Clean
Air Act amendments to send to Congress... IT]hus, technical personnel .. were essentially left on their
own." Melnick, supra note 96, at 277. For an interesting analysis of these organizational variables and
their impact on attempts at political control, see William J. Pielsticker, Executive Branch Review and
Regulatory Outcomes (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
101. See Sandra G. Boodman, Chick Koop, Unpredictable Surgeon General, WASH. POST NAT'L
WKLY. EDITION, Jan. 11, 1988, at 6-7.
102. This sequence of events is well known. For a good description of these events and their
political significance, see JOHN F. KENNEDY SCH(x)L OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: RUCKLESHAUS RETURNS (Case No. C 16-85-638, 1985).
103. Rose-Ackerman and others have noted other failures of the Reagan Administration's effort
to redirect agencies. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment on Ferejohn and Shipan's
Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 21, 25 (1990). Meier summarizes an
extensive case study literature on the subject. See MEIER, supra note 9, at 167-81.
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agency policy-making.
B. Ex Post Vetoes and Political Control
Despite the fact that the ex ante control argument seems to have garnered
more attention recently within the PPT literature, the ex post control argument
has retained vitality, particularly in a number of recent formal models. t n Like
their ex ante counterparts, many of these models of ex post control obscure
some of the reasons why agencies retain considerable policy-making
discretion. In particular, these models overlook important impediments to ex
post political control by employing some questionable assumptions, namely
(1) that Congress and the President know or can learn what the agency is
doing and make veto decisions accordingly, 0 5 (2) that the policy preferences
of both the Congress and the President are known to the agency when it
makes its policy choice, and (3) that Congress and the President can veto a
targeted policy choice.'0 6 Because the agency's ability to anticipate which
policy choices will be vetoed is integral to models of ex post control, these
models assume that each actor's preferences are single peaked and known to
the other actors. For example, in Figure 1, because A, C, and H each know
what the others will do, the threat of an ex post veto is credible and effectively
constrains the agency's policy choice (at point C(H)). The problem is that for
many agency policy choices, we cannot reasonably assume that (1) politicians
know what the agency is doing, (2) politicians have preferences that are
known to the agency when it- makes its policy choice, or (3) politicians are
willing or able to veto those agency policy choices that they dislike.
1. Monitoring Agency Actions
The information asymmetry problem analyzed in early principal-agent
models is associated with a well established literature, 0 7 and I will not
belabor those arguments here except to reinforce their implications for PPT
models of ex post control. The important point is that the credibility of any ex
post veto threat depends upon the politicians' ability to detect and understand
the agency's policy choice. Some positive theorists argue that oversight
committees can overcome information asymmetries (relative to the agency) by
making use of resources at their disposal, such as staff and interest group
104. See discussion supra Section I.B.
105. Lupia and McCubbins' model focuses on the difficulty legislators have in obtaining reliable
information but argue that legislators can get it when the net benefits of doing so are great enough. See
Lupia & McCubbins, supra note 37, at 1(0.
106. Two-dimensional and dual-principal formal models illustrate the difficulty of using legislation
to veto an agency policy choice when politicians' preferences are dispersed, and the agency is not an
outlier on both dimensions. See, e.g., Spitzer, stq a note 40.
107. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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support. 10 8 Others stress the President's ability to get information and
manipulate policy-making by infiltrating agencies.' 0 9 Notwithstanding these
arguments, the monitoring capacity of presidential and congressional staffs
continues to be overwhelmed by the number of agency policy-makers and the
sheer volume of federal agency policy-making which occurs in Washington.
Agency policy-makers work full-time on individual policy questions, while
oversight is but one of many day-to-day responsibilities facing congressional
and presidential representatives and staffs. 110 Even when disfavored agency
policy-making can be detected, the congressional and presidential agendas
place another resource constraint on their ability to respond. Simply put,
neither Congress nor the President has enough time to identify, understand,
and address every (or even most) important agency policy decision."'
These limits on the ability of Congress and the President to detect and
understand agency policy choices make the prospect of an ex post veto of an
agency policy choice more remote than implied by PPT models. Consider
Figure 4, which offers a different and more realistic depiction of the veto
boundary of the agency's range of choice. From the agency's point of view,
the likelihood that its policy choice will trigger a veto is uncertain. Therefore,
in Figure 4 that veto boundary is defined not by a specific point in the issue
space (as it was in Figure 1), but by a range of policy choices in which the
probability of a veto varies from p = 0 (at point A) to p = / (at point B).
Assume further that the agency's utility over that range increases (as shown),
so that the agency faces some unknown probability of reversal by the
principal (Congress or the President)." 12
108. See discussion supra Section I.B.
109. Id. These conclusions are impficit in the complete information assumption used in many
formal models.
110. Some PPT scholars acknowledge that, while interest group representatives can help bridge
part of the information gap, congressional and presidential staffs cannot rely on such information blindly.
Rather, they must evaluate information obtained from interest groups before using it. See Lupia &
McCubbins, supra note 37, at 3. Limited staff resources act as an information bottleneck, inhibiting
effective oversight.
11. This is not a new argument. In addition to Niskanen, Theodore J. Lowi, Steven Skowronek,
and others have argued that resource constraints render congressional oversight ineffective and make
delegation tantamount to abdication of responsibility. See THEODORE J. LOWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126, 296 (1979) [hereinafter LowI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM]; STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 at 290 (1982); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to
Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 295, 299-309 (1987).
Presidents face difficult obstacles when seeking to monitor agencies. See, e.g., HECLO, supra note 99, at
106-15; NEUSTADT, supra note 99, at 8-9.
112. My example deals with the more interesting case in which the agency prefers a policy that
poses some risk of reversal. If the agency's utility function is such that its preferred policy outcome is at
some point to the left of A, in the range where the probability of a veto equals zero, then the agency will
select that policy.
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utility ul Figure 4
Ipolicy dimension
A C B
The agency's degree of aversion to risk of reversal is reflected by the shape of
the net utility function between points A and B. Thus, we can think of the
agency bureaucrat's net utility (UN) over the issue space as a function of both
policy preferences and the prospect for reversal, such that UN = U(Xp), or
UN = U(X)- pR(X), (1)
where p is the probability of reversal, R is some constant amount of negative
utility associated with reversal, and U(X) is the agency's gross utility as a
function of policy outcomes." 
3
As Figure 4 illustrates, in the absence of any veto threat, pR = 0, the
agency's net utility function will look like U(A2), and the agency will prefer a
policy at point B to any point to the left of B. When the threat of a veto exists
(when the President or Congress knows of and cares enough about the policy
choice to act) but is uncertain over part of the range of choice, the agency will
choose a policy at point C. Sometimes, the agency's estimate of the
probability of a veto will be wrong, and its policy choice will be overturned.
The monitoring problem tends to widen the agency's range of choice in two
ways: first, by lowering the agency's subjective assessment of the probability
of an ex post veto; and second, by lowering the objective probability that a
veto will occur.
113. The probability of reversal will be a function of the policy alternative X. If we assume that
the agency receives no utility from a vetoed policy (as Figure 4 indicates), then equation I could be
rewritten as: UN = U(X)I1-p(X)]. Of course, equation I is but one of many possible algebraic
expressions of the negative influence of a veto on the agency's utility function. Depending on how the
agency values the relationship between U(X) and R, the shape of these curves may be very different,
However, assuming that the agency's utility over policy outcomes (1) is single-peaked, (2) is increasing at
point A, (3) includes the discounted (by p) cost of a veto, and (4) R is sufficiently large, the optimal
policy will lie somewhere between A and B. Only if the agency values avoiding a veto as its first ordinal
preference goal will it choose the policy atA.
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2. Politicians, Preferences, and Anticipated Reactions
I have already alluded to another reason why the probability of an ex post
veto may be low. Frequently, Congress and the President will not have any
discernible preferences over the policy issue facing agencies at the time the
policy choice is made; or, the intensity or importance of those preferences will
be unknown to the agency, such that the point at which the agency's policy
choice will trigger a congressional or presidential reaction is uncertain. For
example, in Figure 1, if the agency (A) does not know where the ideal points
of the other actors (points C and /) lie, it may choose a policy closer to its
ideal point than the result dictated by that model-point C(H). Similarly, the
choice of a policy to the left of point C(H) may not provoke a response if the
other actors have not yet formed opinions on the policy issue and do not yet
have ideal points. 1 4 To the extent that this information about others'
preferences is unknown or unknowable at the time the agency makes its
policy choice, the boundaries on its range of choice will disappear, giving the
agency more leeway (or perceived leeway) to choose its preferred policy
outcome.
Why might agencies lack information about others' preferences? One
reason may be a lack of communication among Congress, the President, and
the agency at the policy formation stage, or the lack of a prior public debate
on the issue. In either case, the agency will be unaware of the preferences of
the other actors. More likely, as is the case with much regulatory agency
policy-making, the policy issue will be new and one for which information is
scarce. In such cases, expert opinion, in the agency and the relevant policy
community, is likely to crystallize long before that of Congress, the President,
and the public.115 In other words, agency experts are likely to learn about
unresolved policy issues first; consequently, agencies will form preferences
and make policy choices in the absence of any information about politicians'
preferences. For these reasons, the agency often has no reason to believe that
a particular policy choice will trigger a veto, and its policy choice will not be
constrained by its anticipation of a veto.
3. Formal and De Facto Veto Authority
Finally, even when politicians have well-known preferences and can
overcome information and resource asymmetries, the power to exercise an ex
post veto is far more limited than implied by PPT models. The limits of
114. It is reasonable to assume that agencies attempt to rationally anticipate politicians'
preferences; but it is not reasonable to suppose that they are often successful. In a First Circuit opinion
that applied the Chevron doctrine, then-judge Stephen Breyer argued that bureaucrats should try to
anticipate legislators' preferences. See Mayburg v. Secretary of HHS, 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1954).
115. As described in Subsections II.A.I and A.2, supra, this is one reason why policy-making
authority is delegated to expert agencies in the first place.
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politicians' veto power over agency decisions are well understood, but many
positive theorists do not seem to have acknowledged them fully. Most PPT
models account for neither these limitations nor for differences in the nature
of the authority exercised by Congress versus that exercised by the President.
Formally, Congress has a far more powerful tool of ex post control than
any possessed by the President: the legislative gatekeeping power.
Theoretically, almost any major agency policy choice can be overturned by
legislation. As a practical matter, however, Congress is handicapped by the
very same collective choice problems that impede ex ante controls. Indeed, it
is not uncommon for Congress to be unable to muster a majority in support of
an ex post legislative response to agency provocation, even when a majority is
unhappy with the agency policy." 6 Once again, Superfund is illustrative.
Since its passage in 1980, the program has been universally-condemned by
industry and environmental interests alike. During that time period, Congress
has had numerous opportunities to overturn many unpopular agency policy
choices. However, the two sides of the dispute dislike the program for
different reasons, making meaningful ex post reform difficult. As I have
argued, these particularly intractable problems are more likely to be shunted
to the agency without substantive guidance in the first place. Just as the
agency's information and expertise advantages enable it to develop well-
ordered preferences on a policy issue before politicians can act, agencies can
use those same advantages to produce a decision when Congress cannot.
The President's formal ex post control powers are more limited than those
of Congress. While presidents can use regulatory review to oversee and
manage the agency policy-making process, they can neither formally dictate
agency policy choices for issues that have been delegated to the agency by
Congress nor overturn those policy choices after the choices have been
made.1 7  Rose-Ackerman's analysis of the Reagan Administration's
unsuccessful attempt to secure the reversal of an IRS decision illustrates these
limits." 8 Professors Strauss and Sunstein put the issue this way: "[T]he
President is not authorized either to make particular decisions statutorily
vested in at least some subordinate officials, or to direct those officials to
make particular decisions. This is true even for executive branch
116. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence:
The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND J. ECON.
463 (1992). It should be noted that this is one reason why some PPT scholars turned their attention from
ex post to ex ante controls. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 41, at 435. However, as I note in
Section [LA., supra, the ex ante control argument is vulnerable to this same criticism.
117. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(finding that OMB had illegally interfered in EPA rule-making).
118. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 103, at 25.
119. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5 1, at 201.
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agencies standing in a direct line of authority running from the President.' 20
On the other hand, the President does have some potentially powerful
tools of ex post control. Most important among these is the power to
discharge political appointees, which may operate as a de facto authority to
veto agency policy choices in certain circumstances.' 21 When the President
has targeted a policy choice for veto, the agency head will often be willing to
carry out the President's veto orders. Nevertheless, as with the use of
appointees to exert ex ante control, this power may be more limited than it
appears at first blush. 122 Appointees who "go native" may resist the
President's orders. Even when political appointees are willing to do the
President's bidding, the exercise of a veto may simply return the policy to the
prior status quo, and the selection of a new policy choice may require the
expertise of those in the agency who supported the initial, vetoed policy
choice. Furthermore, vetoing an agency policy choice can entail significant
political costs. For example, during the Bush Administration, when the Vice-
President's Council on Competitiveness and the OMB sought to change the
content of several EPA policy choices, neither the Council nor OMB was
simply able to direct the EPA to reach its preferred choice. Rather, both White
House agencies were required to spend considerable time, resources, and
political capital before the EPA finally succumbed to White House
pressure.123
The President's ex post veto powers are even more severely curtailed in
the case of independent commissions, which are designed to insulate agency
policy-making from presidential control. In the case of many independent
commissions, presidents may remove commissioners only upon a showing
that the -commissioner has violated some legislatively prescribed criteria,
typically a higher showing than that required for removal of an executive
agency political appointee. The Supreme Court's decision in Humphrey's
Executor v. United States confirmed Congress' right to establish these
criteria.' 24 Furthermore, even the President's appointment power is tempered
120. For a fuller discussion of the constitutional and case law authority for these propositions, see
JERRY L. MASHAW & RICHARD MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
191-231 (2d ed. 1985).
121. One of the first presidents to resort to this method of "persuading" a recalcitrant agency was
Andrew Jackson, who fired his Secretary of the Treasury after he refused to follow Jackson's order to
withdraw government funds from the National Bank. For a description of this incident, see ALFRED H.
KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 319-21 (5th ed. 1976).
122. As Strauss and Sunstein note, the President "will not always be able ... to persuade the
Senate easily to confirm the official who docilely will do his bidding." Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 5 1,
at 200.
123. See, e.g., U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE. AIR POLLUTION: IMPACT OF WHITE HOUSE
ENTITIES ON Two CLEAN AIR RULES (1993).
124. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The Court's opinion included this characterization of one independent
commission, the FTC: "Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an ann or an eye of
the executive. Its duties are performed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute,
must be free from executive control." /d. at 628. The Court reaffirmed Humphrey's Executor in Morrison
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by the fact that commissioners typically serve staggered terms, so that the
President can appoint only one commissioner at a time and must be in office
for several years before he would have been able to appoint the majority of
the commission.
125
Thus, both the President and Congress face important limits to their
ability to exercise ex post vetoes over agency policy choices.1 26 Neither has
the time or the inclination to attempt to exert influence over all or even most
of the important choices. As a consequence, the probability in Figure 4 that
any given agency policy choice will trigger an ex post veto is very slim.
III. The Normative Implications of Political Control
Not only do positive theorists tend to conclude that a significant amount
of political control over agency policy-making does occur, many also operate
from the assumption that, in a democratic republic, a great deal of political
control ought to occur. 127 Indeed, some PPT scholars have tended to take the
notion that "more political control is better" as an article of faith,
characterizing control of agency policy-making by elected politicians as a
condition precedent to a well-functioning democracy. For example, Lupia and
McCubbins have argued that "[a] fundamental question in the study of
democracy concerns the extent to which the will of the governed, as expressed
by their elected representatives, affects the actions of the government."'
28
Of course, elected representatives do not always express the will of the
governed. Electoral accountability does not guarantee that politicians will
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). One formal model in the PPT literature which does incorporate this
limitation is that of Hammond & Knott, supra note 41, at 141-42.
125. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §41 (creating staggered terms for FTC commissioners); 15 U.S.C. §
78(a) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(2) (same).
126. The use of informal policy-making (discussed supra Section II.A.3.) further reduces the ex
post influence of Congress and the President over agency policy choice because informal actions are less
likely to be detected by Congress and the President. All else equal, Congress and the President will be
slower to learn about, and less likely to address, policy choices contained in unpublished internal
memoranda than those proposed as formal rules. In other words, the probability of an ex post veto (as
described by the "p" term in equation I and shown in Figure 4) by Congress or the President is lower
when policy is made informally.
127. PPT legal scholars, whose work tends to be more openly prescriptive than that of political
scientists and economists, have been particularly active in exploring this issue, debating not only the
merits of presidential versus congressional control, but also the questions of how the founding fathers
viewed this issue. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick, supra note 37, at 186-88
(lamenting what they see as increasing presidential control).
128. Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 1994
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 91, 91. See also McCubbins et al., supra note 42, at 243; McCubbins &
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 166. As noted above, Theodore Lowi has also argued that delegation minus
political control equals abdication. See Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM, supra note 11, at 92-94. It
should be noted that some positive theorists appear to remain agnostic on this issue, describing how
politicians and their constituents exert control without taking a position on the normative implications of
control.
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produce good or popular policies; similarly, the lack of electoral
accountability does not guarantee that agencies will produce bad or unpopular
ones.129 This assumption by some positive theorists may be a vestige of the
principal-agent paradigm or of early economic models that portrayed agency
independence as harmful to good government. However, a more immediate
reason for this bias in favor of greater political control may be the tendency of
PPT models to equate the public's preferences with those of elected officials.
This assumption is unwarranted since control of agencies by elected officials
is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure the consistency of agency policy
choices with public opinion. In fact, as I explain below, depending upon the
distribution of public preferences over the policy choice the agency faces, the
public interest may be well served even though Congress and the President
exert little or no control over the agency policy-making process.
130
A. Public Opinion, Issue Salience, and Political Control
In assessing the congruence between policy outcomes and public opinion,
it is important to distinguish among (1) policy issues for which individual
preferences are single-peaked (or "well-ordered") from those for which they
are not, (2) policy issues for which collective preferences-as represented by
the distribution of individuals' ideal points-are single-peaked (such that the
public has an identifiable preferred alternative) t13 and those for which they
are not, and (3) policy issues that are highly salient in the eyes of the public
and those that are not. For particularly complex or intractable problems, there
will often be no generally preferred policy because individual or collective
preferences are not single-peaked. Issue salience goes to the question of
whether the operative preferences of elected politicians are likely to be their
"induced" (by constituent opinion) preferences or their true. preferences. If the
public cares little about the policy issue in question, elected representatives
may opt to act upon their true preferences, believing that the public will give
them the leeway to do so.13 2 Consider Table 1.
129. In the words of Susan Rose-Ackerman: "[R]ecent research in political economy should
undermine glib confidence that every action of the legislature is in the interest of a majority of the
population." ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 10, at 34.
130. For purposes of Section IlA, I assume that the congruence between public opinion and
policy outcomes is the key to this normative debate. I reexamine that assumption in infra Section III. B.
131. Technically, under majority rule there will be a median voter on a single issue-dimension, and
hence a single "preferred alternative," even when the distribution of individual ideal point, is not single-
peaked. I use the term "publicly-preferred alternative" here to mean that the distribution of individually
preferred alternatives is single-peaked. Thanks to Susan Rose-Ackerman for helping me to clarify this
point.
132. For a thorough treatment of this issue, see ARNOLD, supra note 61, at 35-87: BIANCO, supra
note 61. at 63-94: and RICHARD FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMrrrEES (1973).
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Table 1: Is there a publicly-preferred alternative?
Issue Salience Yes No
High High degree of political Controversial,
control likely intractable problems
Low Outcome depends on Unchecked agency
location of preferences independence
PPT formal models tend to fit best with policy issues like those in the upper
left cell in the table. High salience issues on which the public has an
identifiable preferred alternative are likely to produce congruence between the
general public's preferences and those of their elected representatives; elected
representatives are likely to attempt to exert political control over agencies in
these cases. The likelihood that politicians will be able to veto any agency
policy choice that is inconsistent with public preferences may lead the
rational agency to constrain its policy decision-making to ensure that it is
consistent with public preferences.1 33 By the same token, these types of policy
issues are more likely to produce clear legislative intent at the delegation
stage and, therefore, more effective ex ante control as well.
The other three cells represent situations in which agency policy choices
may be effectively unconstrained by the preferences of elected politicians,
assuming (as will often be the case) the absence of controlling legislative
intent. In the lower left cell, there is a publicly-preferred alternative on a low-
salience issue. If the politicians and the agency are in agreement on a policy
choice that is unpopular (as in Figure 5a, where the curve around point 0
represents the distribution of public preferences), there will be no incentive
for politicians to control the agency, and no congruence between public
preferences and policy outcomes unless this state of events generates more
public interest, shifting the policy choice into the upper left cell. This is one
version of the agency capture scenario, one which involves complicity by
politicians.' 34 On the other hand, if the agency's preferences differ from those
of politicians but are consistent with those of the general public (as in Figure
133. As I describe in Part III, PPT models make the strongest case for control by politicians when
politicians' preferences are not dispersed. Therefore, this discussion assumes relative uniformity among
politicians. Of course, if politicians are at an impasse, the deviant agency policy choice will not be easily
vetoed by legislation.
134. Specifically, this kind of capture might involve complicity by the agency's oversight
committee, the agency, and the relevant interest group to form a "subgovernment" or "iron triangle." For
a discussion of subgovemments, see RANDALL RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 8, 324-27 (2d
ed. 1975).
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5b), the agency may be able to choose a policy which deviates from the true
preferences of elected politicians even though issue salience is low.










This is because attempts by politicians to exert ex post control over that
policy choice may increase issue salience, thereby increasing both the
political costs of attempting to exert control and the likelihood that politicians
will be forced to act on their induced, rather than their true, preferences. The
Reagan Administration's failed attempts to roll back regulation may fall into
this category. Because public opinion opposed those efforts, agencies and
interest groups were able to increase public attention to those attempts,
ultimately undermining them.' 35 Finally, where public preferences are
consistent with the true preferences of elected politicians but inconsistent
with the agency's preferences (as in Figure 5c), politicians have an incentive
to exert political control and will do so if they can overcome information and
resource asymmetries, This kind of policy issue presents the ideal opportunity
for reelection-minded politicians to act as political entrepreneurs by seeking
to control the agency because the political costs of exerting control are small
and the benefits great.
When there is no clear public preference on the policy issue in question,
the key question becomes, "Is the issue highly salient?" If the answer is "yes,"
135. See discussion supra Subsection ll.1.3.
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(as in the upper-right cell of Table i), one common reason why public
preferences remain poorly defined is that the policy issue in question is
particularly complex---one that is controversial yet intractable. The previously
mentioned Superfund example may fall into this category. In that case, the
general public preferred that the policy achieve several conflicting goals
simultaneously: that waste sites be cleaned up quickly, that they be cleaned
thoroughly, and that private industry bear as much of the cost of clean-up as
possible. 136 In these situations, political control is problematic (and therefore
less likely) because the choice of any policy alternative will alienate some
important subset of the public. As noted above, 137 this is the kind of policy
issue (1) that is most likely to produce collective choice problems in Congress
and (2) for which the agency can produce a decision when Congress cannot.
Finally, some p9licy questions facing agencies are neither salient nor the
kind of issue for which the public has any clearly identifiable preferred
alternative; these are represented by the lower right cell of the matrix. This
situation mirrors the lower left cell, except that if elected officials can
overcome information and resources asymmetries in order to learn about the
policy issue, the cost of exerting political control over the agency's policy
choice will be very low. This difference means that, in the lower right cell,
public opinion will not prevent politicians from forcing the agency into an
unpopular policy decision, nor will it lead politicians to control or correct
unpopular agency choices. 1
38
Of course, neither the public's preferences nor the salience of the policy
issue in question are fixed. Politicians can try to change the location and
intensity of public opinion. Moe and Wilson argue (correctly, I think) that the
President holds an advantage over Congress in the contest to shape public
opinion,' 39 though Congress' opinion-shaping influence seems to be in
ascendance. However, it does not follow that either can frequently exert
controlling influence over public opinion. To the contrary, many attempts by
recent administrations to steer public opinion have failed.140 More
importantly, politicians' opinion-shaping influence may be particularly
limited in clashes with government agencies over agency policy-making
issues because the public may perceive regulators as experts who are entitled
to deference within their policy arena. In the information age, public opinion
is frequently determined by factors beyond Congress' or the President's
136. See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE ch. 2 (1990).
137. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2.
138. It may be that many of the policy choices that fall into this latter category are relatively
unimportant ones, since neither the public nor politicians are interested in their disposition. However, that
is not always the case.
139. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 34, at 13-15.
140. Once again, the Reagan Administration experience is illustrative. Despite Ronald Reagan's
reputation as the "Great Communicator," he was unable to build public opinion majorities behind his
positions on many campaign issues, including abortion, rolling back environmental regulations, and
eliminating the Departments of Education and Energy.
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control, such as interest group public relations campaigns and news coverage
of catastrophic events. As voters gain access to more and more sources of
information, it seems likely that politicians' opinion-shaping advantages will
diminish.
B. Public Opinion, the Public Interest, and the Courts
By examining the direction and intensity of public preferences separately
from those of elected politicians, we can see that political control is not only
less frequent in the agency policy-making process, it is less necessary to
ensure consistency between agency policy choices and the public opinion. For
most of the situations depicted in Table 1, the public usually gets the policy
outcomes it wants, though not necessarily through the avenue of political
control by elected politicians. This is true in the two left cells of the matrix in
Table 1. In the lower left-hand cell, there will be situations in which an
agency will be able to choose policies the public wants precisely because it is
able to evade political control by politicians whose true preferences differ
from those of the public. Similarly, it is difficult to argue that the public is not
well-served by the situation represented in the upper right-hand cell. When
controversial, important, and particularly intractable problems are delegated
to the agency for resolution, that delegation permits a policy choice to be
made where the political process could not produce one. Such choices need
not be inconsistent with public opinion; if that agency policy choice
eventually becomes unpopular, then it will be shifted into the upper left cell
and an ex post veto of the policy choice becomes more likely.
Only in two situations represented in Table I does the prospect of agency
policy-making discretion seem to produce the chance of policy outcomes that
run counter to the public's best interests: (1) when the agency is able to evade
clearly-expressed public opinion, either with or without politicians'
acquiescence, as shown in the lower-left cell (Figure 5a and sometimes Figure
5c); and (2) when an agency chooses policies that are harmful to the public
interest in the face of public indifference, with or without politicians'
acquiescence, as may occur in the lower-right cell. However, judicial review
adds at least a partial safeguard against both of these outcomes. When there is
no prior statement of legislative intent on the issue in question, the only
standards governing the agency policy choice are the general admonitions that
the choice should be supported by substantial evidence in the case and not
arbitrary or capricious.14 While these standards provide agencies with wide
latitude in'the absence of controlling legislative intent after the Supreme
Court's decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,142 an agency policy decision that is either extremely unpopular
141. Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a)-(b) (1994).
142. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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or unsupported in the administrative record may be more likely to be reversed
in court.1
43
The Chevron Court concluded that the EPA policy choice at issue had
adequate support in the administrative record. The relevant policy community
had well-developed preferences but was divided on the issue, and the general
public was apparently undecided and indifferent, as shown in the lower-right
cell of Table 1. Had the Court found inadequate support in the record, it
would have reversed the agency's policy choice even in the absence of
legislative intent. 144 Similarly, when policy decisions run too far afield of
public opinion, the reviewing court may be more inclined to scrutinize
carefully the administrative record and to apply a less lenient standard of
review. 145 Furthermore, when a court .upholds a low-salience but unpopular
policy choice, interest groups will likely mobilize to increase its salience,
thereby increasing the likelihood that politicians will veto the choice (moving
the issue into the upper-right cell of Table 1).146
Of course, the ability of courts to rein-in agency policy-making in this
way will depend on the ability of interest groups to obtain judicial review of
agency action. After a long period of liberalization of standing and other
access doctrines through the 1960s and 1970s,147 the Supreme Court has
begun to restrict standing in more recent cases.14 8 The up-shot of these recent
developments is that prospective plaintiffs must now meet a higher standard
when demonstrating that they are injured by the agency's action and that their
injury is within the "zone of interests" protected by the legislation at issue.
When there is no plaintiff who is willing or able to meet that standard, there
143. Some PPT models treat judges as maximizers of their own policy preferences, which seems a
particularly unrealistic view. See, e.g., Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 37, at 9-12. Others, however, see
courts as constraint on the temptation of agencies to choose policies contrary to the public interest. See
Macey, supra note 52, at 676. Eskridge and Ferejohn see courts retreating from this role after Chevron,
and lament the danger that retreat poses. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick, supra note
37, at 187. Some see courts responding to public opinion because they are conscious of the prospect that
Congress will override their decision. See, e.g., Spiller & Gely, supra note 116.
144. The converse of this is that decisions for which there is adequate record support will be
upheld, despite clear public opposition. Certainly, relatively few cases fail this reasonableness test under
Chevron. Nevertheless, it stands as an impediment to one form of runaway bureaucracy.
145. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) may be one
such case. The court overturned the FPC's decision to license a hydroelectric project because the agency
failed to consider environmental issues, despite the fact that the agency had piaid little or no attention to
environmental issues in thirty years of granting licenses. While the FPC's policy remained consistent over
time, public opinion changed such that the agency's licensing policy was now deemed unreasonable by
the court. Whether this decision would be decided similarly in the wake of Chevron, however, is
debatable.
146. Alternatively, since policy preferences are a function of expertise, the public's preferences
may move toward those of the agency as the debate provides the public with additional information and
therefore expertise.
147. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669 (1973). This case is generally considered to be the highwater mark for liberalized standing.
148. See, e.g., Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S.
517 (1991); LWlan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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will be. no opportunity for judicial review. On the other hand, there is no
guarantee that courts or interest groups will have the public's preferences in
mind when seeking judicial review. If judges are motivated by their own
preferences over policy outcomes, they may forgo opportunities to rein-in
unpopular or harmful agency choices. 149 Likewise, interest groups whose
goals run counter to the wishes of the public may seek judicial remedies; this
may be true even in the case of citizen suit litigation.' 50 Figure 5 demonstrates
how, in such cases, the plaintiffs' preferences may lie far afield of public
opinion. These caveats aside, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that
judicial review will often act as a beneficial check against unpopular agency
action.
Furthermore, it is important to consider whether congruence between
policy outcomes and public opinion is the key to policy-making in the public
interest. We should consider the possibility that policy decisions may be in
the public interest even when they do not reflect public opinion. For some
policy issues, the public interest may be best served by unpopular policy
choices. For example, politically unpopular policies for which relatively
minor economic costs are "front-loaded" and for which substantial benefits
accrue to future generations may fall into this category.' 51 Economists might
point to free trade as an example where relatively large future benefits (job
growth) accrue to unspecified beneficiaries while relatively smaller current
costs (job loss) accrue to identifiable voters. Within the realm of agency
policy-making, the use of market-based pollution control regulations (taxes
and marketable permits) is another example. EPA economists have
championed this concept since the early 1970s, yet it has been very slow to
gain popular acceptance. 152 Subject to the same caveats discussed above
(about the availability of judicial review and the motives of judges), courts
may uphold a decision for which there is substantial evidence justification in
the record notwithstanding its popularity.
Of course, this potential incongruence between public opinion and the
public interest is the fundamental problem addressed by James Madison in
Federalist No. 10. Madison predicted that "majority factions" might enact bad
policy, and he advocated a constitutional design that would minimize that
danger. 153 When majority opinion runs in favor of "bad" policy, agency
149. Aggressive judicial review of agency policy-making before Chevron produced many
decisions that were criticized as contrary to the public interest. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS
AND SOCIAL POLICY 32-36 (1977); MELNICK, supra note 96, at 1-23, 343-93.
150. See Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen
Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE
REWARDS 107-1I (Michael Greve & Fred Smith eds., 1992).
151. See ARNOLD, supra note 61, at 25-34.
152. For a discussion of this issue, see David B. Spence, Paradox Lost: Logic, Morality, and the
Foundations of Environmental Law in the 21st Century, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 144, 175-78 (1995).
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961). Madison also
believed that forming a majority faction would be more difficult in an extended republic. Id. Admittedly,
Madison's remedy was not to leave policy decisions to unelected agencies. Yet, Madison could not have
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experts ought to be more resistant than politicians to public pressure, not only
because of the effects of electoral accountability, but also because
bureaucrats' expertise makes them less easily persuaded to the merits of bad
policy.154 This is not to say that agency discretion is always exercised in the
public interest. It is not. The point is that the degree of political control
politicians exercise over agency policy-making is neither the sole nor the most
important determinant of whether agency policy serves the general public. 55
To the contrary, depending on the preferences of the various actors, political
control may facilitate agency capture, and agency independence may prevent
it.
IV. Concluding Thoughts and an Illustration
I have argued that many positive theorists employ assumptions that tend
to obscure the reasons why politicians cannot control agency policy-making
discretion, and why that is not necessarily a bad thing. In other words, PPT
models often do not address the question they set out to address-that is,
whether politicians "may be able to rely on the bureaucracy to formulate
policies that they themselves would have formulated if they had spent the
time and resources necessary to acquire the bureaucracy's level of
expertise." 156 The problem is that we cannot answer this question merely by
examining politicians' preferences and the ways politicians try to steer or
push the agency toward well-defined policy outcomes. To paraphrase an old
adage, "where you stand-and whether you take a stand at all-depends upon
where you sit." In other words, unless and until politicians actually acquire
the agency's expertise, their ability to understand and act upon agency policy
choices is far more limited than PPT models imply. One final example will
help to illustrate this fundamental point.
As part of the regulatory reform movement of the 1990s, the call for more
foreseen the era of instantaneous information dissemination and continuous public opinion polling, both
of which seem to facilitate the formation and effectiveness of majority factions. For an explanation of this
argument, see Spence, supra note 152, at 168-71.
154. The free trade and environmental policy examples described above illustrate this point.
Perhaps a better illustration is provided by the asbestos scare of the mid-1980s. While there is no doubt
that exposure to asbestos presents a serious health risk, many experts warned that much of the asbestos in
buildings was better left undisturbed. Nevertheless, public fears over exposure risks led to congressional
legislation in 1986 which, in turn, prompted the widespread and costly removal of asbestos in schools.
Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2656 (1994).
155. That PPT models continue to depict control by electorally-accountable politicians as a
necessary prerequisite to policy-making in the public interest seems ironic, especially given the
connections between the PPT and collective choice literature. Clearly, elected politicians often pursue
unpopular policies without electoral consequences. The connection between legislative product and
public opinion (or even between legislative product and individual legislators' opinions) is far from
perfect.
156. Lupia and McCubbins, supra note 37, at 1.
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rational risk regulation has grown stronger. Academics,' 57 blue ribbon
panels, 158 and even a Supreme Court Justice 159 have added their voices to the
chorus calling for risk regulation reform. The common theme of these
analyses is that if the primary goal of environmental, health, and safety
regulation is to reduce risks,' 6 then our current public spending priorities are
certainly misplaced. We spend relatively little money addressing
comparatively serious risks like indoor air pollution, and enormous sums
addressing comparatively trivial risks like hazardous waste cleanup.
161
Reallocating resources to address the former concern would provide
significantly greater health benefits without increasing costs. Citing numerous
similar examples, 162 advocates of rational risk-based regulation have proposed
various reforms, such as the creation of a risk management agency in the
executive branch charged with reorienting regulatory spending to correct this
problem, 163 or presidential directives to individual agencies to reorient their
spending accordingly. Not surprisingly, politicians in both parties have
embraced these seemingly sensible goals.164
So why haven't these prescriptions been implemented, and why does it
seem unlikely that they will be implemented soon? 165 I submit that a large part
of the answer lies in politicians' inability to control agency discretion-that
157. See, e.g., JOHN HIRD, SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
(1994).
158. See, e.g., EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS (1987); HARVARD GROUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT REFORM, REFORM OF RISK REGULATION:
ACHIEVING MORE PROTECTION AT LESS COST, I HUMAN. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 183 (1995).
159. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993).
160. Of course, the risk regulation debate includes strong critics of this basic proposition. Some
contend that risk-based decision making is inherently undemocratic and elitist, and that there are other
equally important goals served by the current system of environmental, health, and safety regulation. This
literature is too large to summarize here. For a good description of the problem and arguments on all
sides, see HIRD, supra note 157, at 181-256.
161. See BREYER, supra note 159, at 21; HIRD supra note 157, at 100.
162. Some analysts compare risks across regulatory programs. See, e.g., EPA, supra note 158
(focusing on EPA spending); BREYER, supra note 159; HARVARD GROUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT
REFORM, supra note 158.
163. Justice Breyer proposes a statutorily-created independent commission, while the Harvard
Group proposes a White House agency created by executive order. See BREYER, supra note 159, at 61;
HARVARD GROUP ON RISK MANAGEMENT REFORM, supra note 158, at 190-93.
164. See e.g., Senators Dole, Johnson Unveil Compromise on Regulatory Reform, Risk
Assessment, UTIL. ENVT. REP. July 7, 1995, at 1.
165. Of course, one obstacle to this type of reform is our piecemeal, problem-centered regulatory
scheme; which has created numerous statutory barriers to reallocation of government resources. These
include budget allocations to specific programs and agencies, as well as specific legislative provisions
prohibiting or limiting the consideration of costs in making risk regulation decisions. Interestingly, the
commonly cited examples of the latter have been watered down recently. The Delaney Clause, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3) (1994), which prohibited even minute amounts of carcinogenic additives in foods regardless
of risk or cost, was reinterpreted in Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1992). The Clean Air Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1685-1686, required EPA to set standards for hazardous air
pollutants that provide "an ample margin of safety to protect the public health." This provision effectively
limited the EPA's use of risk assessments in regulating hazardous air pollutants prior to its amendment in
1990. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994). See also NRDC v. EPA. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(authorizing EPA to consider costs in setting standards as long as safety is assured).
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is, to control the exercise of this risk management power once it is delegated.
Suppose Congress and the President were to enact legislation creating an
executive branch risk management agency. The new agency would have the
power to reallocate regulatory resources and priorities so as to maximize the
net risk reduction benefits of federal spending. Presumably, this new risk
regulation agency's central task would be to effect a massive redistribution of
the benefits of regulation. Such a redistribution would create countless
political fault lines among interest groups, geographic regions, and existing
agencies. In the previously-cited Superfund example, a gain for OSHA would
amount to a loss for both the EPA and the citizens of New Jersey. Similarly, if
nonpoint source water pollution (runoff) is deemed to be a more important
problem than industrial point source pollution,' 66 the resulting shift in the
focus of regulators' attention would be industry's gain and agriculture's loss.
The number and complexity of these fault lines make it unlikely that
Congress could provide ex ante legislative guidance to constrain the agency's
choices in any meaningful way. Any such attempt to steer the agency would
surely alienate important constituent groups, thereby jeopardizing the
viability of the majority legislative coalition. It would be easier and wiser
politically for legislators to leave these controversial issues to the agency.
Furthermore, even if the political will to exert ex ante control were present,
politicians could not possibly foresee all of the important dimensions of the
agency's future policy choices. Risk assessments depend on rapidly-changing
scientific knowledge, and the agency will make its choices with the benefit of
information and expertise unavailable to politicians at the legislative
enactment stage. For these same reasons, structure and process controls would
have only limited influence over most of the agency's risk management
choices. Certainly, specifications about the makeup, organization, and
decision process of the agency could have some impact on its behavior. For
example, an independent commission with broad powers and composed only
of scientists would be less amenable to presidential control than an executive
agency headed by a political appointee whose decisions required the assent of
other affected agencies. However, as the agency goes about the business of
assessing risks and making choices in the future, new problems and new
information will soon overwhelm the effects of structure and process as
determinants of the agency's policy choices. Just as we view the risks
associated with undisturbed asbestos in buildings much differently than we
did a decade ago, even the best agency designer will not be able to foresee the
circumstances this new risk management agency would face and cannot hope
to design the agency to react to them in predictable ways.
As noted in Part IM, introducing the preferences of the public into this
calculus complicates the picture considerably. Not only would politicians face
166. See, e.g., EPA, NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION IN THE U.S.: REPORT TO CONGRESS (1984);
BREYER. supra note 159, at 21.
Vol. 14:407, 1997
Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making
uncertainty about the future policy outcomes that would result from the
creation of this risk management agency, they also would face uncertainty
about how the public would feel about those outcomes. This uncertainty
offers additional incentives for politicians not to exert ex ante control over the
agency. Moreover, because their electoral vulnerability makes politicians
more sensitive to public preferences, the probability of an ex post veto of the
agency's risk management decisions will be determined, in large part, by
those public preferences. For example, suppose our hypothetical risk
regulation agency were to shift resources from the Superfund program to the
regulation of indoor air. Also suppose that that shift were to be supported by
Republicans and their primary constituent groups, but opposed by Democrats
and their primary constituent groups. If the issue were not salient to the public
or if no majority opinion on the issue were apparent, the prospects for
overturning the agency's decision would seem dim. If overruling the agency
required legislation (because the agency was either de jure or de facto
independent167), Democrats could secure a reversal of the decision only if
they control both houses of Congress and the Presidency. If the agency were
neither de jure nor de facto independent, a Democratic President would be
more likely to be able to influence the agency's decision, although that might
depend on the parties' assessment of the public's likely preferences when and
if the issue became salient. If the agency could muster public support for its
position, its chances of.resisting presidential pressure would be enhanced. If,
on the other hand, a groundswell of public opposition arose in response to the
agency's reordering of regulatory priorities, the prospects for an ex post
reversal would be improved considerably. First, if the agency was
independent, Republicans in control of either house or the Presidency might
be unwilling to take the political risk of opposing reversal. Second, if the
agency was not independent, a Democratic President would have more
leverage with the agency in his attempted to secure a reversal.
Thus, the key will be the public's reaction to these agency choices. That
reaction can be. shaped by the "education" efforts of interest groups and
politicians alike. The important point is that that reaction is unpredictable and
unknown at the time the agency makes its policy choice. At that point in time,
a hierarchy of knowledge and expertise governs most policy choices (with the
agency and other members of the policy network at the top, the public at the
bottom, and politicians in the middle). Because politicians have less
information than the agency, and because politicians' preferences over
outcomes will depend upon future public reactions to those outcomes, most
important agency policy choices are constrained neither by enabling
legislation nor by the threat of a congressional or presidential veto. This is the
167. That is: (1) the agency as an independent commission; (2) the executive agency head resists
the President's attempts to secure a policy reversal and is not fired; or (3) the President's veto is
overturned in court.
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crucial aspect of the delegation problem that is obscured by models that posit
the existence of preferences over outcome for all actors at or before the time
the agency makes its decision. PPT has already shed considerable light on the
incentive structures facing policy-maximizing politicians who seek to
influence certain agency policy choices; it has shed less light on the agency
policy-making process itself. Before it can achieve that objective, positive
theorists must do a better job of accounting for these common impediments to
political control. 16
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The input of legal scholars into the political control debate should speed
that process and may also contribute to a broader appreciation for the
normative implications of political control. Indeed, the political control issue
has important implications for ongoing normative debates over the merits of
the legislative veto, the proper scope of judicial review, and the effects of
presidential and congressional regulatory review proposals. As the risk
regulation example illustrates, agency policy-making independence is not
synonymous with bad government, nor does it necessarily lead to bad policy.
Therefore, positive theorists ought not to take a dim view of agency
independence or treat as naive the notion that uncontrolled agencies might
serve the public interest. The public may approve of our hypothetical
agency's risk management decisions irrespective of what politicians want.
Alternatively, some might argue that rational risk regulation is good policy
irrespective of what politicians or the public want. The point is that by
equating political control of agencies by politicians with a well-functioning
democracy, some positive theorists present a false dichotomy. A closer look at
the interaction among the preferences of the agency, politicians, and the
general public reveals that sometimes the public interest is better served not
by more political control, but by less.
168. Newer models which incorporate outcome uncertainty (like Bawn's, supra note 55) and
some of the legal impediments to political control (like Hammond & Knott's, supra note 41) are a step in
the right direction. A comprehensive explanation of why PPT models employ methods which omit these
important variables is beyond the scope of this article. I have suggested that the answer is, in part,
traceable to earlier economic models of agency behavior. We can speculate about other factors which
may be at work here as well. For example, some of the political science works which explore the central
role of bureaucrats in the policy-making process contend that agency decisions are not rational choices.
See discussion supra Section I.A. It is therefore not surprising that PPT models have found so little
common ground with these approaches. In the case of formal PPT models, another contributing factor
may be positive theorists' attempts to play to the strength of rational choice methods-that is, the quest
for parsimony and solvability. Without some of their more untenable assumptions, formal models yield
fewer results. A third, related potential factor may be the tendency for the theorist's reach to exceed her
grasp. Instead of attempting to lay out a single, parsimonious theory of administrative behavior or of the
policy process, PPT models of smaller parts of that process might bear more fruit. In particular, more
focused inquiries might do a better job of yielding testable hypotheses.
Vol. 14:407, 1997
